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1 General Introduction 
Although most modern societies agree that everyone should receive adequate access to 
medical treatment, health care systems worldwide vary greatly in terms of financing of 
health care costs, the provision of medical services, and regulatory aspects (Böckmann, 
2009; p. 10). Rising costs, economic downturns, and the demographic development have 
embraced the call for change particularly with regard to financing of health care costs 
and access to health insurance.  
Most health care systems have developed historically, but underwent funda-
mental changes as a consequence of policy decisions and reforms over the last decades. 
In Germany, for instance, reforms predominantly aimed at fostering efficiency by means 
of market-based instruments in a public health care system with a high level of cross 
subsidization between individuals. In the U.S., a diverging trend can be observed: With 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, affordable and universal health 
insurance coverage has been introduced to a previously predominantly competitive, 
expensive, and highly fragmented health care system. Even though these two health 
care systems differ in its origin and alignment, health reforms typically occur in the con-
flict field of social aspects and economic arguments (i.e. competition).    
This thesis aims to draw a comprehensive picture of economic problems of 
health insurance and, thereby, assesses economic goals and analyzes effects of recent 
health reforms in the two historically grown very different health insurance systems of 
Germany and the U.S. More specifically, three research questions will be addressed: 
First, looking at the demand for supplemental health insurance (SuppHI) in the after-
math of benefit reductions in German Statutory Health Insurance (SHI), it investigates 
what factors drive the demand for SuppHI and what are possible sources of selection. 
Furthermore, this thesis offers new insights on what the two health insurance systems 
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can learn and take over from each other. In this context, it discusses how new trends in 
health insurance in the U.S. (i.e. Health Savings Accounts (HSAs)) could be implemented 
in German SHI. The third focus of this thesis is on the mutual interdependence of public 
and private health insurance markets. Analyzing financial data of private health insurers 
in the U.S., it looks into the question of how premiums in Private Health Insurance (PHI) 
are affected by public health insurance programs (i.e. Medicaid). 
The following section of this chapter first briefly discusses economic problems of 
health insurance. Furthermore, it gives an overview on the German and U.S. health care 
system, identifies potential shortcomings, and summarizes major reform proposals that 
have been implemented over the last two decades. It therefore helps to understand 
recent health policy developments in a broad economic context. 
 
1.1 Economic Problems of Health Insurance 
When analyzing economic problems of health insurance, it is important to consider that, 
unlike other markets, the health care market contains some special characteristics: 
Health care services can be classified as public goods and their consumption can cause 
external effects. Furthermore, the health care market contains many distortions and 
lacks essential characteristics of a perfect market (i.e. market transparency, perfect 
competition, and consumer sovereignty) due to incomplete and asymmetric information 
(Breyer et al., 2005). Thus, free market forces with regard to a price and quality competi-
tion can foster efficiency to a limited extent only in the health care market. 
In the context of health insurance, incomplete and asymmetric information exist 
on both: The individual’s inherited risk type at the point of signing an insurance contract 
and changes of its risk type over time. This lack and/or asymmetry of information can 
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result in market adjustments or government interventions aiming to redistribute rents 
or to correct market failures. 
In a competitive health insurance market, the insured pays premiums equal to 
his expected losses in the market equilibrium according to the principle of individual 
equivalence. However, it is regarded as an unfair financial burden, if higher health care 
costs are the result of inborn disadvantages or deteriorations of health through no fault 
of his own. Based on the concept of Harsanyi (1955) and Rawls (1971) that individuals 
operate from behind a veil of ignorance, a financial redistribution between high risk and 
low risk types to level out unequal start-off chances would be viewed as fair. Individuals 
would then have to agree to participate in this arrangement at a point of time when 
they do not know yet about their actual health state (Breyer et al., 2005). 
With regard to the risk of deteriorating health (i.e. a change from a low risk to a 
high risk type) two market economy solutions to insure this premium risk have been 
discussed in economics literature: Guaranteed renewable contracts (Pauly et al., 1995) 
and premium insurance (Cochrane, 1995). In the concept of guaranteed renewable con-
tracts, individuals pay a prepayment to insure the risk of becoming a high risk in ex-
change for the health insurer’s commitment to provide a guaranteed premium. 
Cochrane’s approach to insure premium risk is to offer a separate insurance contract, 
which pays out an indemnity to individuals in case their health state worsens. A third 
alternative to insure premium risk relies on governmental intervention in regulating 
insurance premiums though community rating. This regulatory approach implies pooling 
contracts and mandatory insurance for individuals in combination with the insurers’ 
obligation to contract. In addition, in order to avoid risk selection, a risk adjustment 
scheme must be employed to level out differences in the insurers’ risk structure if indi-
viduals have the freedom to choose a health insurer (Breyer et al., 2005; Kifmann, 2002). 
  
4 
Although interfering with individual preferences and limiting freedom of choice, com-
munity rating is a means to ex-ante redistribute premium differences between low risk 
and high risk types. Furthermore, this type of governmental intervention provokes cov-
erage for high risk types the private market deems uninsurable or for whom private 
coverage is unaffordable.  
Theoretical research has long emphasized the potential importance of asymmet-
ric information, which has been most commonly studied in the context of principal-
agent problems (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The two concepts of adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard are well recognized, as both have their underlying cause in 
asymmetric information.  
Adverse selection describes a situation where an individual's demand for insur-
ance is correlated with the individual's risk type. If the price for insurance is uniform and 
does not vary according to the risk type, high risks will buy more insurance as the risk 
type is unobservable and the individual has better information about it. Consequently, 
expected losses on average will increase and the insurance will raise the premium. High-
er prices will cause low risk types to opt out of insurance, which can worsen the adverse 
selection problem even more and may lead to complete failure of the insurance market. 
Adverse selection has been discussed repeatedly in the economics literature (Pauly, 
1974; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Wilson, 1977), but depending on the line of coverage 
and the dataset, evidence of adverse selection has been mixed.   
While adverse selection is caused by hidden information, the concept of moral 
hazard refers to hidden actions. In general, moral hazard occurs if an individual’s behav-
ior or motive to prevent or limit a loss is altered due to insurance protection (Shavell, 
1979). Two types of moral hazard can be distinguished. One refers to the behavioral 
change before the event of a loss or also known as ex-ante moral hazard. In this case, 
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the insured has no incentive to invest into loss prevention, as it only reduces his income 
but has no direct effect on his utility when the insurance cannot observe his effort. Par-
tial insurance contracts are usually a second best solution for ex-ante moral hazard as 
they reduce the cost of insurance and set an incentive to invest into effort, thus, directly 
reducing the loss probability (see Pauly, 1974; Shavell, 1979). In contrast, ex-post moral 
hazard describes a behavioral change after the event of a loss. In this case, the insured 
has no incentive to try to reduce the size of the loss as costs are borne by the insurance. 
Once again, deductible contracts are a second best solution for ex-post moral hazard to 
set the incentive to minimize costs. Moral hazard has been analyzed in various insurance 
settings. In the context of health insurance, the RAND Health Insurance Experiment 
(RAND HIE) is deemed the most influential study of moral hazard. In this experimental 
study, individuals were randomly assigned to different coverage levels. The study finds 
evidence that changing from universal coverage to insurance plans with deductibles 
and/or copayments significantly reduces demand for medical care (Manning et al., 
1987). In the French health insurance market, evidence for moral hazard can be found as 
well; for individuals who experienced an increased deductible the number of general 
practitioner home visits significantly decreased (Chiappori et al., 1998). 
 
1.2 The German Health Insurance System and Reforms 
Germany has a dual health insurance system, with a market- based PHI and a SHI. About 
90% of the German population is insured in SHI while the remaining 10% are covered 
through private health insurers. Whether individuals are privately or statutory insured 
depends on their income: Individuals with an income above the threshold for compulso-
ry insurance are eligible to opt out of SHI and switch into PHI, where they must undergo 
a risk assessment and pay risk-based insurance premiums. Benefits in PHI are subject to 
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bilateral contracts between the insurance company and the insured, and therefore, vary 
a lot due to the exclusion of pre-existing conditions or benefit eliminations in favor of 
premium reductions. In contrast, coverage in SHI is almost uniform and offered through 
highly regulated SHI funds, which are public health insurance entities. Private health 
insurers in Germany are profit-seeking stock companies or mutual insurance companies 
in a capital cover system characterized by risk based premiums and individual equiva-
lence. That means insured pay (theoretically) constant premiums including high aging 
reserves at the beginning of the contract period, which are invested at the equity mar-
ket and yield interest, hence to suffice increased health expenditures in the future. In 
context of the approaches described above to cover premium risk, contracts in PHI can 
be classified as guaranteed renewable contracts with a prepayment (i.e. ageing re-
serves). 
The German SHI shows resemblances with the historical model of social health 
insurance and follows the regulatory approach of community rating with pooling con-
tracts, mandatory insurance for individuals, and the insurers’ obligation to contract. It is 
based on an unfunded pay-as-you-go system and follows the principle of solidarity, as 
insured pay contributions according to their economic capacity (i.e. income-related 
premiums up to the contribution assessment ceiling and which the employer subsidizes 
by almost 50%) and receive medical services to the extent they need. This financing is 
characterized by interpersonal and intergenerational reallocation and subsidization, as 
redistribution is taking place from the healthy to the sick, high incomes to low incomes, 
younger to older individuals, and unmarried individuals to families as insurance for de-
pendents and spouses without significant income is free of charge (Simon, 2009). How-
ever, the dual system of health insurance is criticized to imply a considerable degree of 
adverse selection against SHI, as risk-related premiums in PHI set the incentive for 
healthy and high-income individuals to seek coverage in PHI (Greß, 2007). Meanwhile, 
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insured with more dependents benefit from free coverage for non-working spouses and 
children in SHI. Several studies analyzed the insurance structure and risk profiles of in-
sured in the public and private health insurance system in Germany. They find evidence 
that enrollees in PHI are on average healthier, have higher incomes, and have fewer 
dependents than insured in SHI (see e.g., Kriwy and Mielck, 2006; Mielck and Helmert, 
2006; Dräther, 2006).  
The German health care system has seen a variety of reforms over the last dec-
ades. Until 1992, health reforms can be summed up to the overall strategy of cost con-
tainment, which predominantly aimed at keeping contribution rates stable. Foremost, 
with the introduction of the Health Care Structure Reform Act of 1993 (“Gesund-
heitsstrukturgesetz”) market-based management instruments have spread into many 
areas of the health care sector. It initiated far-reaching structural reforms, e.g. it opened 
SHI funds to all insured independent of their profession and place of residence and gave 
the insured freedom of choice of a SHI fund while sickness funds remain subject to the 
obligation to contract. Starting in 1994, a risk-structure compensation scheme has been 
introduced to eliminate competitive disadvantages of health insurance funds that had 
an unfavorable risk structure. 
The two subsequent health reforms of 2003 and 2007 focused in particular at 
designing a sustainable financing and fostering competition, meanwhile, keeping cost 
increases moderate. Expanding competitive patterns in the health care market aim to 
greater efficiency, ensure a high quality of care, and grant individuals’ decision-making 
power.  
The introduction of the Health Care Modernization Act of 2003 (“GKV-
Modernisierungsgesetz”) modernized the supply structures of the German health care 
system, while the transformation of individual co-payments and benefit exclusions (e.g. 
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for non-prescription drugs, vision aids, and dentures services) reduced spending and/or 
increased cost sharing.  
The SHI Competition Re-enforcement Act of 2007 (“GKV-Wettbewerbsstärkungs-
gesetz”) primarily pursued the goal to strengthen competition in SHI. For this purpose, a 
health fund and uniform contribution rates were introduced to SHI in 2009. Further-
more, SHI funds are allowed to differ in optional benefits and offer a broader variety of 
tariffs with the introduction of Flexible Health Plans (“Wahltarife”). Simultaneously, the 
existing risk structure compensation scheme has been extended by the compensation of 
morbidity characteristics, thereby reducing incentives for risk selection. 
While the latter reform points predominantly intensified competition between 
SHI funds, new regulations affecting PHI have been introduced in order to stimulate 
competition between SHI and PHI. Since 2009, private health insurers are obliged to 
offer a basic tariff with equivalent scope of benefits of SHI, while premiums may not be 
calculated equivalent to risk. Furthermore, the portability of aging reserves (in the 
amount of the basic tariff) when exchanging the private insurer is intended to foster 
competition among private health insurers. However, it must be noted that recent 
health reforms have only induced an assimilation of the two systems, but the dichotomy 
between SHI and PHI with its different financing, access, and supply of medical services 
remain a major challenge in the German health care system. 
 
1.3 The U.S. Health Insurance System and Reforms 
The U.S. health care system is characterized by its fragmentation and many included 
stakeholders. Various market components are competitive and there is a belief among 
parts of the society that the protection against health risks is left to the individual’s deci-
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sion and not duty of the government. Health insurance is provided by several different 
private and public entities. Most individuals are privately insured through their employ-
er, while individuals who do not have access to employer-sponsored health insurance 
can obtain private coverage individually through direct purchase (DeNavas-Walt et al., 
2011; Kaiser, 2014). Public programs insure health risks of the elderly through the social 
insurance program Medicare while the needy can receive care through the means-
tested program Medicaid. Publicly provided universal coverage has not been available 
until 2014, leaving almost 46 million U.S. citizens uninsured (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2011).  
Many companies offer health insurance to their employees as a voluntary bene-
fit. In absence of collective labor agreements, employees could not claim it. Due to rising 
health insurance costs, especially small employers (3-199 employees) reduced offering 
health coverage in recent years (Kaiser, 2014). Employer-sponsored health insurance has 
been criticized to be inefficient because of its fiscal promotion (Feldstein, 1973; Pauly 
and Goodman, 1995). Opponents argue that it leads to distortions in the demand for 
health insurance and the financing of medical services. At the same time, it is considered 
unfair regarding accessibility, because it is only available for individuals who worked for 
employers that arrange such coverage. The strong dependence of health insurance cov-
erage and employment lead to another weakness: workers and their families lost their 
health insurance coverage when they changed or lost their jobs. The Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 eliminated at least the latter issue through the 
portability of health insurance coverage and further obliged health insurance companies 
to cover pre-existing conditions.  
Contract design in PHI has greatly changed in recent decades. Fee-for-service 
used to be the most widespread compensation scheme, where services are unbundled 
and paid for separately, thus, lacking the incentive to minimize costs. Spurred by the 
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enactment of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, managed care ar-
rangements have become the most common coverage option in PHI throughout the 
1980s. Managed care is an approach to delivering and financing health care through one 
entity that is aimed at both improving the quality of care and saving costs. However, 
managed care has experienced an erosion of trust (much discussed as managed care 
backlash) in the later part of the 1990s. It was criticized for limiting consumer choice and 
not achieving its overall goal of controlling medical costs.  
Passed by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
in 2004, consumer-directed health care (CDHC) received a boost due to new regulations 
and constitutes a new trend in PHI. It allows members to use a tax-exempt HSAs, Health 
Reimbursement Arrangement (HRAs), or similar medical payment products to pay rou-
tine health care expenses directly, while a High-Deductible Health Plan (HDHP) protects 
them from catastrophic medical expenses. Supporters particularly emphasize the poten-
tial of HSAs to induce an economical consumption of medical care and thus, reduce 
overall health care costs. Customers choose consciously adequate medical treatment 
and also influence physicians to provide health care in a more efficient way. CDHPs are 
seen by proponents as a way to make health care more affordable and expand access to 
health insurance in the U.S. (see e.g., Bunce, 2001; Schwartz, 2001). Critics fear that 
HSAs will induce selection effects such that primarily healthy individuals with a high in-
come will select CDHC (see e.g., Remler and Glied, 2005; Hoffman and Tolbert, 2006). 
Despite these concerns, HSAs are fostered by the individual insurance mandate from the 
latest reform and thus, are expected to further increase demand for CDHC. 
Although the U.S. looks back on a long history of health reforms, structural 
changes have rarely been accomplished. Foremost, the Patient Protection and Afforda-
ble Care Act of 2010 can be regarded as a landmark reform. It provides a comprehensive 
  
11 
system of mandated health insurance. U.S. citizens and legal residents are now required 
to have qualifying health coverage; otherwise, they have to pay a penalty tax. The same 
regulation affects employers with 50 or more full-time employees, as they are now re-
quired to offer health insurance to their workforce. In order to expand access to health 
insurance, state-based American Health Benefit Exchanges are created through which 
individuals can purchase coverage, with premium and cost-sharing credits available to 
individuals/families with income between 133-400% of the federal poverty level. Fur-
thermore, separate Exchanges through which small businesses can purchase coverage 
are created (Department of Health & Human Services, 2015). Finally, extending the 
Medicaid program by raising access to individuals with income up to 133% of the federal 
poverty level can be seen as the core measure to cope with the high number of unin-
sured. 
 
1.4 Overview 
Looking back on recent health reforms in the U.S. and Germany two divergent trends 
can be observed: Over the last two decades, German SHI primarily experienced benefit 
cuts and had to implement economic incentives and market-based instruments to a 
solidary-based social security model in order to overall contain costs. At the same time, 
recent health reforms in the U.S. have shown that a solely market-based health insur-
ance system is hardly consistent with modern society’s ideas on fairness and distributive 
justice. Furthermore, the exclusion of large parts of the population from seeking health 
insurance as a result of high premiums is not only associated with high costs and nega-
tive effects (even for those holding insurance coverage), but overall seen as highly ineffi-
cient.  
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In the subsequent chapters of this thesis, individual aspects of recent health re-
forms both in Germany and in the U.S. will be discussed and/or empirically analyzed. 
   Chapter 2 addresses the effects of the Health Care Modernization Act of 2004 
in the context of SuppHI in Germany. Benefit cuts for dental care and higher co-
payments increased the demand to complement or substitute existing health insurance 
options. The chapter empirically assesses the selection effects and determinants of the 
demand for SuppHI that covers hospital and dental benefits. Using data from the Ger-
man Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the study does not only consider the individuals’ 
risk attitude, their demand for medical services, and insurance purchases in other lines 
of insurance besides rich demographic and socioeconomic information. Furthermore, it 
uses doctor-diagnosed illnesses to assess the individual’s health status, and thus, does 
not have to rely on self-reported health-status measures as usually used in previous 
studies. 
Chapter 3 discusses suitable ways to implement HSAs in German SHI following 
the legislation of the SHI Competition Re-enforcement Act of 2007, which provided Ger-
man SHI funds with the possibility to offer Flexible Health Plans (§ 53 Social Security 
Code  V). The chapter explains the design of HSAs from a technical and economical point 
of view, and reviews experiences from the U.S. and other countries. Furthermore, it 
examines a detailed approach to implement HSAs to SHI that is consistent with the ex-
istent health insurance system while it places a special focus on implementation details.  
Chapter 4 analyzes the interdependence of the PHI market and the public Medi-
caid program in the U.S. As the extension of the Medicaid program is viewed as one of 
the core measures of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, it will af-
fect Medicaid itself and also have a far-reaching impact on the financing of health care 
costs in the U.S. overall. The chapter evaluates how the price for health insurance cov-
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erage in the PHI market relates to the design and extent of government provided health 
insurance and thus, addresses cost shifting issues related to uncompensated care. To 
this end, by looking at firm level data from the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners (NAIC), the analysis assesses how coverage in public state health programs 
relates to premiums in comprehensive business of private health insurers. Unlike previ-
ous studies, it takes the different institutional setups and the insurers’ participation into 
account as the federal-state Medicaid program significantly differs from state to state. 
Furthermore, important state demographics as well as features of the health care mar-
ket are controlled for.  
This thesis ends with a general summary of the results and concluding remarks 
in Chapter 5. 
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2 Supplemental Health Insurance in Germany – Improv-
ing Quality of Care and Closing Coverage Gaps 1 
2.1 Introduction 
There is a common trend in countries with public health care systems to incrementally 
reduce benefits as a consequence of high and steadily rising health care costs. The deci-
sion to complement public coverage is left to the individuals, depending on their finan-
cial ability, their preferences, and farsightedness with respect to future health risks. 
Supplemental health insurance (SuppHI) contracts are highly relevant in regulated 
health care systems with standardized statutory coverage and restricted choice of 
health-care providers and services as in Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands or 
the U.S. (e.g., McCall et al., 1986; Saliba and Ventelou, 2007; Van de Ven and Schut, 
2008; Schokkaert et al., 2010; Simon, 2013).  
In Germany, 17.55 million policies of supplemental coverage were in place in 
2012 among the 69.71 million individuals insured under public coverage. Premiums writ-
ten accounted for 19.73% of the overall private market for health and long-term care 
insurance (Association of German Private Healthcare Insurers, 2012). Given the signifi-
cance of SuppHI, this paper analyzes the main determinants of demand and investigates 
whether the market suffers from adverse selection using data from German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP).  
The market for SuppHI has been in the focus of previous work, particularly with 
respect to potential adverse selection issues. Marquis and Phelps (1987) investigate the 
potential impact of adverse selection issues on the demand for SuppHI in the RAND HIE. 
The authors find that health characteristics are an important driver for whether individ-
                                                                
1 
 This paper is a single authored manuscript by the candidate and yet unpublished. The author 
wants to thank several persons for their insightful comments during academic seminars: 
members of the Faculty of Business, Economics, and Social Sciences - particularly the col-
leagues from the Institute of Health Care & Public Management - at the University of Hohen-
heim and at the Institute of Risk Management and Insurance of LMU Munich. 
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uals choose SuppHI from a hypothetical and retrospective point of view. Woolfe and 
Goddeeris (1991), Browne and Doerpinghaus (1994) and Ettner (1997) find mild evi-
dence for adverse selection in Medicare SuppHI (Medigap) while Dardanoni and Li Donni 
(2012) find evidence of adverse and advantageous selection. Fang et al. (2008) find that 
seniors with Medigap coverage have significantly lower health expenditures. When they 
control for health condition, they do, however, find evidence of adverse selection. As 
Medigap insurance purchasers are per definition older than 65 years, the discussed find-
ings may be specific to the age group. Several studies investigate the demand for SuppHI 
with a focus on different age groups (see Cohen and Siegelman, 2010). Schokkaert et al. 
(2010) also find weak evidence for adverse selection in the Belgian market for SuppHI, 
while Saliba and Ventelou (2007) find no evidence that health risk considerations affect 
the decision to purchase SuppHI in France.  
With regard to the German market for SuppHI, Christoph (2003) finds evidence 
that the demand for SuppHI increases with the individuals’ self-assessed health. Howev-
er, he does not distinguish between different lines of coverage. Vargas and Elhewaihi 
(2008) analyze German SuppHI in the context of moral hazard and identify a positive 
correlation between the likelihood of holding SuppHI and the number of doctor visits. 
Yet, reverse causality may be suspected. Kapfer (2008) investigates supplemental hospi-
tal benefits using the GSOEP data for 2002 and 2004. She finds evidence for risk selec-
tion in the SuppHI market. Schmitz (2011) analyzes GSOEP data from 2002 and finds 
evidence for advantageous selection, indicating that healthy individuals are more likely 
to buy supplemental hospital insurance due to higher risk aversion. In contrast to these 
studies, we divide our dataset into two age groups, consisting of individuals of age 65 
and younger and individuals above 65 as we suspect different effects for the age groups. 
Different preferences among these age groups may offer one possible explanation for 
the mixed findings with respect to adverse selection in previous studies.  
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Adverse selection has been discussed repeatedly in the economics literature 
(e.g., Pauly, 1974; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Wilson, 1977). A widespread approach 
to test for adverse selection is to examine the correlation between the chosen insurance 
contract and the occurrence or severity of losses (Abbring et al., 2003). However, from 
an empirical point of view, it is difficult to disentangle adverse selection (higher risks 
chose more generous coverage) from moral hazard (more extensive coverage may in-
crease health expenditures), as the causality relationship between cost and coverage 
can be reverse (e.g., Chiappori and Salanié, 2000; Gardiol et al., 2011). Finkelstein and 
McGarry (2006) note that adverse selection effects can be overshadowed by individual 
preferences such as wealth, risk attitude, and insurance preferences and, therefore, 
suggest that adverse selection may be much more widespread than empirical studies 
have been able to prove. Not surprisingly, evidence of adverse selection has been mixed 
depending on the line of coverage and the dataset.    
When investigating health insurance specifically, many studies overcome the 
problem of unobserved preferences and moral hazard by simultaneously estimating the 
demand and the utilization of health services (e.g., Holly et al., 1998; Vera-Hernández, 
1999; Schellhorn, 2001; Nuscheler and Knaus, 2002; Werblow and Felder, 2003; Schok-
kaert et al., 2010). Other studies use the individuals’ self-assessed health status to test 
for adverse selection (e.g., Browne, 1992; Christoph, 2003). Having access to a very rich 
dataset, we are able to circumvent the above-mentioned problem of disentangling ad-
verse selection and moral hazard. Besides the earlier available demographic and socio-
economic information, since 2009, GSOEP includes data on chronic diseases diagnosed 
by a doctor. Linking the 2009 diagnosis with the 2008 insurance and socio-economic 
information, we do not have to deal with potential measurement errors, usually intrinsic 
to self-reported health variables. In addition, we are able to control for a variety of fac-
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tors that are suspected to impact insurance demand and possibly overshadow adverse 
selection effects such as risk attitude, income, and insurance affinity. 
To preview our main findings, we find evidence for adverse selection for individ-
uals aged 65 and younger: less healthy individuals are more likely to buy hospital Sup-
pHI. For seniors, we see the reverse effect; namely, that healthier individuals are more 
likely to hold hospital SuppHI. We attribute this to a decline in private information on 
health status over one’s lifetime as argued by Peter et al. (2014). We focus on two lines 
of SuppHI: hospital and dental coverage. As premiums differ substantially between the 
two lines and individuals may have different motives when seeking supplemental dental 
or hospital coverage. We find that insurance affinity, measured by the switching behav-
ior in SHI and the demand for life insurance, positively affects the demand of SuppHI. 
Finally, income positively affects the demand for both types of SuppHI.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the Section 2.2 we give a 
short overview of the institutional background and the role of SuppHI in Germany. Sec-
tion 2.3 presents the hypotheses. A description of the data and methodology follows in 
Section 2.4. We then present and discuss the results from our empirical analysis (Section 
2.5) and validate the robustness of our results in Section 2.6.The final section concludes 
the paper (Section 2.7). 
 
2.2 Institutional Background and Supplemental Health Insurance in 
Germany  
In Germany, nearly 90% of the population is insured under the public SHI with a highly 
uniform and regulated coverage. Non-profit sickness funds provide coverage and enrol-
lees can freely choose their health insurance provider. Premiums are basically uniform 
for all sickness funds and are not risk-based but income-related with average contribu-
tion rates of about 14% on gross income for 2008.  Only about 10% of the German popu-
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lation is insured under PHI as individuals only become eligible for private insurance, if 
their income is above a threshold or they are self-employed. These individuals have the 
choice to opt out of SHI and obtain private coverage or remain under SHI. Coverage in 
PHI is less strictly regulated and subject to individual underwriting, and therefore, it is 
especially attractive to healthy and high-income individuals.  
Over the last two decades, several cost-containment policies restricting cover-
age in SHI have resulted in increased out-of-pocket expenses (i.e., the 2004 health care 
reform has significantly cut benefits for dental care and increased co-payments for pre-
scribed drugs). This contributed to the rise in demand for SuppHI. The Association of 
German Private Healthcare Insurers (2010) reported 20.98 million SuppHI policies in 
2008. 73.36% were bought by insured under SHI. This equals a proportion of 21.92% of 
insured under SHI holding additional private health insurance coverage. 
In Germany, SuppHI contracts are sold by the private insurance industry. There 
are four major types: hospital benefits, dental benefits, prescription drugs and adju-
vants, and health insurance when travelling abroad. Supplemental hospital benefits cov-
er semi-private or private rooms instead of a public ward and treatments by more senior 
physicians (i.e. the chief physician). It mostly aims at improving the quality of care during 
hospitalization. Dental coverage predominantly closes the coverage gap of SHI benefits 
and further includes higher quality services like better fillings etc. Therefore, it can be 
regarded as a hybrid between quality aspects and reducing out-of-pocket expenses. 
Prescription and adjuvant plans main purpose is to reduce out-of-pocket expenses, 
whereas SuppHI when travelling abroad covers costs of treatments and return transport 
from overseas (outside the European Union).  
We focus on supplemental hospital and supplemental dental insurance for the 
following reasons: First, these types of SuppHI constitute the two lines of business with 
the highest demand in the German market. Second, motives for the purchase of SuppHI 
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may differ. Supplemental hospital insurance mainly focuses on quality aspects. It en-
hances the publicly provided insurance as it covers semi-private or private rooms, and 
treatments by more senior physicians. Supplemental dental coverage focuses in particu-
lar on protecting against a financial risk, which arises from coverage gaps in SHI benefits, 
but also includes higher quality services like better fillings. Therefore, it can be regarded 
as a hybrid between quality aspects and reducing out-of-pocket expenses. Part of our 
contribution is to compare a quality- and a financially oriented line of SuppHI and dis-
cuss similarities and differences in one paper.  
SuppHI contracts are underwritten on an individual basis and are guaranteed re-
newable (see Pauly et al., 1995). Individual underwriting is most rigorous for hospital 
benefits using the same standards as private comprehensive health plans.  Premiums in 
the market are therefore risk-based and insurance companies can deny applicants based 
on pre-existing health conditions. Dental SuppHI also utilize risk-based underwriting, but 
in less detail. 
Based on data from the GSOEP, Figure 2.1 illustrates the demand for SuppHI of 
insured under SHI in percent overall and by line of business between 1999 and 2008.  In 
1999, only 8.24% of individuals insured under SHI had SuppHI, whereas by 2008 about 
22.68% held additional health insurance coverage. SuppHI for hospital benefits rose 
rather constantly over time as measured by the portion of publicly insured. The demand 
for the other three lines of business rose substantially. This is especially the case for 
supplemental dental insurance after the health reform of 2004, which increased by 
231% between 2004 and 2008 (from 7.39% to 17.07%). 
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Figure 2.1: Share of SHI Enrollees with SuppHI, 1999–2008 
Notes: The percentage of SuppHI is not the sum of the percentages in the different lines of business because 
individuals can hold multiple supplemental health benefits under SuppHI insurance. 
Source: SOEP v25. 
 
 
2.3 Hypotheses 
In this section, we first briefly outline the theoretical foundation for our hypotheses 
before we state our detailed hypotheses. Based on the existing literature, this section 
also provides a discussion of the control variables. 
 
Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection is one of the most commonly discussed insurance market imperfec-
tions and may lead an inefficient market outcome, as low-risk policyholders may be ra-
tioned (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). We restrict our analysis of adverse selection to 
hospital SuppHI, as there are no indicators of dental health in the GSOEP data. Adverse 
selection models à la Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) suggest that individuals with poorer 
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health are more interested in purchasing supplemental hospital benefits as well as re-
newing their existing plans as they are more likely to consume medical services. At the 
same time, insurance companies underwrite risks individually trying to overcome poten-
tial issues of adverse selection.  
An individual’s health state can impact the demand for SuppHI in two ways ac-
cording to the theory of adverse selection: Individuals with chronic diseases may be 
expected to more likely initiate getting coverage and also to renew their policies (Cohen 
and Siegelman, 2010) which are guaranteed renewable in Germany. Our dataset allows 
us conclusions about the aggregate effect. However, the data set does not provide de-
tailed information to disentangle these two sources of adverse selection.  
Several arguments can be considered, which potentially explain the mixed evi-
dence on the existence of adverse selection in SuppHI. One reason is varying underwrit-
ing standards and contract characteristics in different countries, which naturally influ-
ence the existence and magnitude of potential adverse selection issues. Another argu-
ment are measurement errors: Self-reported health state as utilized by Kapfer (2008) is 
often critiqued for including several biases. Individuals vary in their perception or may 
have different reference points when they are asked to judge their health.  Following 
Bolhaar et al. (2012), we use an indicator variable to estimate the individual’s health 
state using the doctor diagnosed sicknesses: asthma, cancer, coronary heart disease 
(CHD), dementia, depression, diabetes, high blood pressure, and migraines (see Schok-
kaert at al., 2010). We supposedly have relatively comparable information on individu-
als’ risk type as German private insurers gain from medical underwriting with respect to 
sickness information and previous hospital stays. A simple t-test shows that the likeli-
hood of hospital stays and number of hospital nights are statistically significantly greater 
at the 1% level for individuals with one of the above-mentioned sicknesses. This implies 
that individuals with one or more of these diagnoses can be expected to cause higher 
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expected hospital costs. At the same time, we do not expect a significant moral hazard 
problem with respect to hospital SuppHI as these diseases are usually diagnosed by pri-
mary care doctors. Furthermore, the reliability of our health variable compared to self-
reported measures is unlikely affected by e.g. socio-economic status as all observed 
individuals are insured under German SHI.2  
In our analysis, we test whether the observed health state in 2009 measured by 
doctor-diagnosed illnesses has an impact on holding SuppHI in 2008.  Given the chronic 
nature of most of the diseases included in our sample, it is likely that a significant num-
ber of the individuals identified as chronically ill in 2009 were already sick in 2008. The 
sick variable is also likely to capture individuals with private information on their future 
health state, i.e. that they may come down with one of these illnesses in the following 
year.  
Using medical service utilization may also be delicate to bias due to moral haz-
ard. Accordingly, we do not construct a bivariate model in order to test for adverse se-
lection using individuals’ number of hospital stays, days hospitalized, and doctor visits 
but we utilize our constructed indicator variable. This circumvents the problem of having 
to disentangle adverse selection effects from (ex-post) moral hazard, see e.g. Dardanoni 
and Li Donni (2012). Kapfer (2008) uses a bivariate adverse selection model and does 
not find evidence for adverse selection in the German market for SuppHI. Furthermore, 
Cohen (2005) argues that differing findings of the cost-coverage relationship among 
different subgroups in the sample rather imply hidden information than hidden action. 
This supports our adverse selection hypothesis as we find different results regarding 
adverse selection based on age group. 
                                                                
2
  Crossley and Kennedy (2002) find that the reliability of self-assessed health status is strongly 
related to other observable variables such as age, income, and occupation. 
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Furthermore, adverse selection effects may be overshadowed by individual 
preferences implying advantageous selection (see Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006). We 
are able to control for a range of individual preferences which have been suspected to 
potentially cause advantageous selection such as risk attitude, individual’s financial situ-
ation, and the propensity to purchase insurance (Cohen and Siegelman, 2010). 
We add to the arguments the hypothesis that adverse selection only exist for 
younger individuals. Peter et al. (2014) argue that private information on the health 
state resolves as most illnesses materialize over time, i.e. towards retirement age and 
older. Fang et al. (2008) even find evidence that retired individuals in the U.S. with Sup-
pHI (Medigap) have significantly lower health expenditures than individuals without 
SuppHI. Accordingly, we separately investigate retired and non-retired individuals. 
Summing up, we propose the adverse selection hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Supplemental hospital insurance suffers from adverse selection for 
individuals younger 65 years. 
 
Affinity to Insurance 
Several studies show that some individuals have a higher propensity to insure than oth-
ers after controlling for demographic and socio-economic factors (e.g., Pourat et al., 
2000; Saliba and Ventelou, 2007; Schokkaert et al., 2010). We use the person’s observed 
effective demand for life insurance and whether an individual has switched her SHI in 
the previous year to create dichotomous variables we subsume under the heading in-
surance affinity. Both measures indicate whether an individual has acquainted herself 
with the concept of insurance and will therefore be considered to have an insurance 
affinity. The variable Change of SHI Provider indicates whether an individual has 
switched to another SHI fund in the previous period. Changing the SHI fund involves 
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decisions concerning insurance, financial, and quality aspects and therefore implies that 
the insured consciously made a decision for a specific sickness fund. Previous studies 
using GSOEP data (e.g., Christoph, 2003; Kapfer, 2008) find a positive impact of whether 
an individual has switched her sickness fund in the last year on the likelihood of holding 
supplemental health insurance. Yet, holding life insurance has not been included in their 
analyses, which we add to our analysis. 
In this context, we further include the individuals’ self-assessed risk attitude to 
disentangle insurance affinity from varying risk attitudes among individuals. Theoretical-
ly, it is assumed that the individual’s demand for insurance increases with the degree of 
risk aversion. Hence, a more risk averse individual is more likely to purchase insurance 
and spend more on insurance (Dionne and Eeckhoudt, 1985; Briys and Schlesinger, 
1990). In order to control for changes in the individual’s risk attitude resulting of a 
change in wealth, we control for the interaction of risk attitude and adjusted household 
income in our regressions. Thus, we propose the insurance affinity hypothesis as fol-
lows: 
Hypothesis 2: Insurance affinity increases the demand for supplemental hospital 
and dental benefits. 
 
Income 
Several studies have investigated the impact of income on the demand for SuppHI in 
different countries. Garfinkel et al. (1987) investigate the demand for SuppHI under 
Medigap in the U.S. They find that higher income individuals are more likely to have 
insurance coverage. Borrell et al. (2001) investigate the demand for SuppHI in Spain 
which offers a higher quality of care (reduced waiting times and elective surgeries). They 
find that higher social class is an indicator. The study of Schokkaert et al. (2010) on Bel-
gian supplemental hospital insurance indicates a strong impact of individuals’ socio-
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economic background. Saliba and Ventelou (2007) also find a strong and significant ef-
fect of income on the decision to purchase SuppHI in France. Vargas and Elhewaihi 
(2008) investigate GSOEP data and find that higher income is positively correlated with 
holding SuppHI in Germany. Their cross-sectional probit model, however, indicates that 
income is only significant on the 10% level. Furthermore, they do not account for differ-
ent types of SuppHI, which vary from health insurance for travel, which costs a couple of 
Euros per year to hospital SuppHI which can amount to € 50-70 per month. Accordingly, 
motives for seeking different kinds of coverage can be suspected to vary widely. In our 
analysis, we use the logarithmic adjusted household income definition from the GSOEP 
dataset. We later test the robustness of results by using per capita income.  
Our study provides insights from the demand for SuppHI for lines that are more 
quality oriented as well as aiming at closing coverage gaps in the same country. This is 
particularly interesting as we assume that income should have a differing impact on 
these lines. We hypothesize that income generally has a positive impact on the demand 
for SuppHI, as sufficient funds must be available in order to afford SuppHI. At the same 
time, a higher income also enables the individual to cover possible out-of-pocket ex-
penses more easily from the ongoing financial situation. Accordingly, we hypothesize 
that the income effect should be lower for dental SuppHI than for hospital SuppHI as the 
first one is more affordable and mostly aims at closing coverage gaps. 
Although, dental procedure expenses can easily reach high levels, dental SuppHI 
covers the gap in SHI benefits for reasonable insurance premiums affordable to the ma-
jority of the German population. In contrast, supplemental hospital insurance mostly 
aims at improving the quality of hospital services offered to the individual. As the latter 
coverage is the significantly more expensive, we believe that income is even more im-
portant in this line of insurance. The following hypothesis summarizes the discussion: 
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Hypothesis 3: Higher income increases the demand for SuppHI. We see a strong-
er impact of income for hospital insurance than for dental cover-
age.  
 
In addition to our three main hypotheses, we also control for several character-
istics which have been which have been repeatedly discussed in the literature. The like-
lihood of demand for SuppHI relates to several demographic factors such as gender 
(Schokkaert et al., 2010), age (Browne and Doerpinghaus, 1994), household size (Ettner, 
1997), education (Dardanoni and Li Donni, 2012), occupational status and regional dif-
ferences (Saliba and Ventolou, 2007). In addition, we include data on the type of SHI 
(Kapfer, 2008) and control for the individual’s physical constitution using the body-mass-
index (BMI) (Schokkaert et al., 2010). Furthermore, our dataset includes information on 
self-reported risk attitude, which we also incorporate in our model. We use this variable 
in our analysis instead of proxy variables for risk attitude such as smoking, as Dohmen et 
al. (2011) proof the validity of the self-reported measure. This variable is of particular 
relevance to the study of adverse selection as individual preferences can overshadow 
adverse selection effects as discussed by Finkelstein and McGarry (2006). Oftentimes, 
researchers do not have information on risk attitude available, particularly if they use 
data from an insurance company such as Browne (1992). 
 
2.4 Data and Methodology 
In our analysis, we use GSOEP data, which is a representative, longitudinal panel survey 
of private households in Germany containing around 12,000 households with approxi-
mately 21,000 individuals. The survey has been conducted on a yearly basis since 1984. 
Besides demographic and socio-economic variables, the dataset includes various health 
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indicators, data on life satisfaction, and in-formation on health insurance (Wagner et al., 
2007). 
Individuals insured under German SHI are asked whether they have additional 
private health insurance and which benefits are covered i.e. hospital, dental and/or oth-
er additional coverage. This constitutes our two binary coded dependent variables, indi-
cating whether an individual holds hospital or dental SuppHI or not. 
For our analysis, we use the 2008 wave of the GSOEP. It contains the most re-
cent available data on SuppHI, which we can merge with information on doctor-
diagnosed sicknesses in the following year.  The complete sample covers 19,664 obser-
vations. We drop individuals who report to either be civil servants and self-employed as 
these individuals mostly insure themselves under private health insurance. Furthermore, 
we clean the data of individuals who unofficially work within the family as their health 
insurance status is unclear. In addition, we drop additional 1,486 individuals who report 
not to be insured under SHI. We lose another 1,437 individuals when we merge the 
2009 sickness data into the 2008 dataset. As a last step, we clean the data of missing 
values for the controls. We then divide the dataset into two subsets: A first dataset only 
including individuals of age 65 and younger (9,804 observations) and a second dataset 
with individuals older than 65 (3,030 observations). We do this for the following two 
reasons: As explained above, we hypothesize that private information on health state 
diminishes with age. In addition, we measure insurance affinity with a variable whether 
an individual holds life insurance. As there a rigid age limits imposed in the German 
market for life insurance excluding the majority of seniors from initiating or continuing 
coverage, we suspect that holding life insurance will not be a powerful predictor for 
insurance affinity for seniors. 
The exogenous regressors contain a set of control variables as gender, age, in-
come, occupational status and group, education, household size, and state of residence. 
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Insurance status differs with regard to whether the insured is a compulsory or a volun-
tarily member, family insured (i.e. non-working spouse or child) or other member (i.e. 
unemployed or retiree) of the SHI. We also control for whether an individual has 
switched her SHI fund in the previous period, which indicates the individual’s willingness 
to design their health insurance. 
In 2009, questions on chronic diseases diagnosed by a doctor were included in 
GSOEP for the first time. Therefore, we merge the 2009 sickness data into our 2008 da-
taset. Because of the chronic nature of these diseases, it is straightforward to assume 
that almost all individuals who reported one of the diseases in 2009 have already been 
at least partially affected in the previous wave, and therefore had information that 
would influence their demand for SuppHI.  
We create a sickness indicator variable, which equals one if an individual has one 
or more of the following diseases: asthma, cancer, CHD, diabetes, hypertension, mi-
graines, dementia, and depressions. Table 2.1 displays the mean of the several chronic 
conditions in our sample. Overall, 32.47% of the individuals (non-retirees) in our sample 
are sick according to our indicator variable. 
Previous studies on the demand for SuppHI and adverse selection in health in-
surance had to rely on self-reported health state measures or on data from the SF-12 
questionnaire, which generates a quality of life measures including questions on physical 
and emotional well-being, energy and fatigue and is frequently used in studies including 
health state. Following a similar approach of Schokkaert et al. (2010) for Belgian data, 
we use the GSOEP data including actual sickness indicators. Using these indicators, we 
are able to find evidence for adverse selection.  
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Chronic Diseases in 2009 
  Individuals Age ≤ 65 Individuals Age > 65 
 
(N=9,804) (N=3,030) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Diabetes 0.0424 (0.2016) 0.1894 (0.3919) 
Asthma 0.0473 (0.2123) 0.0587 (0.2352) 
CHD 0.0417 (0.2000) 0.2627 (0.4402) 
Cancer 0.0248 (0.1555) 0.0884 (0.2840) 
Migraines 0.0576 (0.2331) 0.0320 (0.1761) 
Hypertension 0.1752 (0.3802) 0.4719 (0.4993) 
Dementia 0.0004 (0.0202) 0.0099 (0.0990) 
Depression 0.0534 (0.2249) 0.0376 (0.1903) 
Sick in 2009 0.3247 (0.4683) 0.6868 (0.4639) 
Notes: Sick in 2009 is not the sum of the means of the different chronic diseases as individuals 
could be affected by more than one disease. Table 2.1 is based on GSOEP data from 2009. The 
percentages above are very similar to the stated percentages concerning the sickness struc-
ture of the Belgian population in Schokkaert et al. (2010). 
 
 
The descriptive statistics of our sample, which consists of 9,804 observations, 
shows that 925 individuals (10.56%) held supplemental hospital insurance in 2008 (Table 
2.2). Despite the fact of individual underwriting and the insurers’ possibility to deny cov-
erage due to pre-existing conditions, 307 of the individuals with hospital SuppHI are 
defined sick according to our indicator variable. 
 
Table 2.2: Sick in 2009 and Supplemental Hospital Contracts, 2008 
 
Hospital SuppHI No Hospital SuppHI Total 
Sick in 2009 307 2,876 3,183 
Not Sick in 2009 618 6,003 6,621 
Total 925 8,879 9,804 
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In addition to demographic, socio-economic variables (i.e. education, occupa-
tional status, and logarithmic adjusted household income), and data on health insurance 
status (i.e. compulsory, voluntarily, family or other insured), we consider individual fac-
tors, assessing i.e. the individuals’ health and insurance affinity, as exogenous regressors 
in our model as explained in the previous section. To estimate the demand decision for 
supplemental hospital and dental coverage, we fit two independent probit equations for 
the dichotomous event of purchasing versus not purchasing supplemental hospital and 
dental coverage with respect to socio-demographic, economic, and individual factors, 
assessing i.e. their health and risk type, insurance affinity, and health. A general formu-
lation of this model is: 
ijijXSuppHIHospitalP  )(         with i=1, … N and j=1, ... , M          (1) 
ijijXSuppHIDentalP  )(             with i=1, … N and j=1, ... , M          (2) 
where N = sample size and M = # of variables. 
 
Furthermore, we also run the Cohen-Siegelman test for adverse selection where 
we regress the existence of coverage on risk type including all relevant controls. Accord-
ingly, we have the following equation: 
𝑃(𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑘2009) = 𝜃 + 𝜗 ∙ 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐼 + 𝜇 ∙ 𝑌𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖𝑗  with i=1,...,N and j=1,...,M      (3) 
where N = sample size and M = # of variables. 
 
Table 2.3 illustrates the summary statistics for all variables included in the two sam-
ples by age. 
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics of Variables in the two Samples, 2008 
 
Individuals Age ≤ 65  Individuals Age > 65 
Variables Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables 
 
 
 
 
 
     Hospital benefits 0.0943 (0.2923)  0.0967 (0.2956) 
     Dental benefits 0.1491 (0.3562)  0.0802 (0.2716) 
Variables of interest 
 
 
 
 
 
     Household income (log) 7.8438 (0.5484)  7.5400 (0.4906) 
     Sick in 2009 0.3247 (0.4683)  0.6868 (0.4639) 
     Life insurance 0.6106 (0.4876)  0.2215 (0.4153) 
     Change of SHI provider 0.0648 (0.2461)  0.0155 (0.1236) 
Control Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
     Male 0.4505 (0.4976)  0.4462 (0.4972) 
     Age 42.5363 (12.8756)  73.3112 (6.0025) 
     Age: younger than 25 0.1269 (0.3329)  
       Age: 26-35 0.1780 (0.3825)  
       Age: 36-45 0.2568 (0.4369)  
       Age: 46-55 0.2500 (0.4330)  
       Age: 56-65 0.1883 (0.3910)  
       Age: 66-75 
  
 0.6894 (0.4628) 
     Age: 76-85 
  
 0.2686 (0.4433) 
     Age: Older than 85 
  
 0.0419 (0.2004) 
     BMI 25.8924 (4.7671)  27.1819 (4.1567) 
     Household size 2.8577 (1.2599)  1.8007 (0.6150) 
     Monthly net income 2934.84 (1662.06)  2137.95 (1265.10) 
     Risk attitude 4.5172 (2.2425)  3.8010 (2.3156) 
     Hospital stay in t-1 0.0937 (0.2915)  0.1825 (0.3863) 
     Self-ass. health: Very  good 0.0968 (0.2957)  0.0168 (0.1287) 
     Self-ass. health: Good 0.4460 (0.4971)  0.2149 (0.4108) 
     Self-ass. health: Fair 0.3118 (0.4633)  0.4581 (0.4983) 
     Self-ass. health: Poor 0.1453 (0.3525)  0.3102 (0.4627) 
     Low level of school 0.3896 (0.4877)  0.7363 (0.4407) 
     Medium level of school 0.3740 (0.4839)  0.1515 (0.3586) 
     High level of school 0.2363 (0.4249)  0.1122 (0.3157) 
     Blue collar worker 0.2502 (0.4332)  0.0129 (0.1127) 
     White collar worker 0.4309 (0.4952)  0.0112 (0.1054) 
     Trainee 0.0860 (0.2804)  0.0003 (0.0182) 
     Unemployed 0.0793 (0.2701)  0.0013 (0.0363) 
     Retired 0.0725 (0.2594)  0.9601 (0.1958) 
     No job 0.0811 (0.2730)  0.0142 (0.1183) 
     SHI mandatory member 0.6340 (0.4817)  0.2139 (0.4101) 
     SHI voluntary member 0.0926 (0.2899)  0.0343 (0.1821) 
     SHI family member 0.1613 (0.3678)  0.0360 (0.1863) 
     SHI other member 0.1121 (0.3155)  0.7158 (0.4511) 
Observations 9,804  3,030 
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2.5 Results and Discussion 
Table 2.4 shows the marginal effects and significance levels of the exogenous regressors 
on the demand for hospital and dental SuppHI for the full model (Model II and Model IV) 
for all individuals below the age of 65. In order to assess the robustness and to better 
identify the impact of the main drivers on the demand for SuppHI, we further estimate a 
reduced model (Model I and Model III) where we only include the variables gender, age, 
household income (log), and the individual’s health status approximated by the indicator 
variable Sick in 2009. We are able to investigate our adverse selection hypothesis only 
for hospital benefits, because the GSOEP does not include any information on dental 
health. We test the hypothesis in two ways: we first follow Schockaert et al. (2010) and 
include the health indicator into the demand equation (Table 2.4). In a second step, we 
run the Cohen-Siegelman test for adverse selection where we regress coverage on the 
health indicator (Table 2.5).   
In the reduced Model I for individuals aged 65 and younger, we find that the 
sickness indicator is statistically significant at the 5% level supporting the adverse selec-
tion hypothesis. The likelihood of SuppHI is higher for those who have a chronic illness. 
In the full model, the indicator Sick in 2009 is significant at the 10% level. We find only 
small deviations from the full model in terms of marginal effects for the sickness indica-
tor in the hospital model. Having at least one of the above listed diseases, the likelihood 
for holding hospital SuppHI increases by 1.45% (vs. 1.18% in the full model) which indi-
cates the existence of adverse selection for individuals age 65 and younger. The differ-
ences are not as high as in order to assume a severe robustness issue. As mentioned 
above, previous studies have examined the GSOEP dataset have come to the conclusion 
that there is no adverse selection in the demand for supplemental hospital insurance 
(see Kapfer, 2008). 
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Table 2.4: Probit Regressions on Hospital and Dental SuppHI for Individuals Age ≤ 65, 2008  
 
Pr(Hospital SuppHI) Pr(Dental SuppHI) 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Variables of Interest 
            Household income (log) 0.0738 *** (0.0054) 0.0634 *** (0.0118) 0.0772 *** (0.0070) 0.0696 *** (0.0154) 
Sick in 2009 0.0145 ** (0.0064) 0.0118 * (0.0061) 0.0139 * (0.0081) 0.0107 
 
(0.0078) 
Life insurance 
   
0.0316 *** (0.0056) 
   
0.0632 *** (0.0072) 
Change of SHI provider 
   
0.0278 ** (0.0122) 
   
0.0605 *** (0.0163) 
Control Variables 
            Male -0.0093 * (0.0055) -0.0080 
 
(0.0058) -0.0262 *** (0.0071) -0.0258 *** (0.0076) 
Age: younger than 26 -0.0428 *** (0.0070) -0.0396 *** (0.0088) -0.0717 *** (0.0096) -0.0535 *** (0.0130) 
Age: 26-35 0.0195 ** (0.0089) 0.0018 
 
(0.0080) 0.0285 *** (0.0115) 0.0054 
 
(0.0107) 
Age: 46-55 -0.0091 
 
(0.0072) -0.0131 * (0.0068) -0.0008 *** (0.0098) -0.0110 
 
(0.0094) 
Age: 56-65 0.0043 
 
(0.0084) -0.0002 
 
(0.0092) 0.0135 *** (0.0111) 0.0032 
 
(0.0121) 
BMI -0.0020 *** (0.0006) -0.0012 * (0.0006) -0.0008 *** (0.0008) 0.0002 
 
(0.0008) 
Household size 
   
-0.0180 *** (0.0027) 
   
-0.0324 *** (0.0037) 
Risk attitude 
   
-0.0048 
 
(0.0177) 
   
-0.0025 
 
(0.0227) 
Risk attitude*income 
   
0.0006 
 
(0.0022) 
   
0.0005 
 
(0.0029) 
Hospital stay in t-1 
   
0.0042 
 
(0.0094) 
      Low level of school 
   
-0.0218 *** (0.0065) 
   
-0.0346 *** (0.0084) 
High level of school 
   
0.0270 *** (0.0076) 
   
0.0092 
 
(0.0092) 
Blue collar worker 
   
-0.0097 
 
(0.0072) 
   
-0.0211 ** (0.0091) 
Trainee 
   
0.0141 
 
(0.0162) 
   
-0.0107 
 
(0.0184) 
Unemployed 
   
-0.0076 
 
(0.0138) 
   
-0.0402 *** (0.0151) 
Retired 
   
-0.0028 
 
(0.0140) 
   
-0.0076 
 
(0.0176) 
No job 
   
0.0100 
 
(0.0125) 
   
-0.0172 
 
(0.0144) 
SHI voluntary member 
   
0.0104 
 
(0.0090) 
   
-0.0030 
 
(0.0114) 
SHI family member 
   
-0.0114 
 
(0.0089) 
   
-0.0294 *** (0.0115) 
SHI other member 
   
-0.0085 
 
(0.0116) 
   
-0.0171 
 
(0.0148) 
Log Likelihood -2,851.86 -2,758.02 
  
-3,969.12 
  
-3,814.03 
  Notes: Standard deviations reported in parentheses. ***,**,* significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Reference groups: Age: 36-45, Medium level of school, White-collar 
worker, SHI compulsory member. 
3
3
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In contrast to previous studies, we split the data into two subgroups: Individu-
als of age 65 and younger and individuals older than 65. In addition, we use actual 
sickness data to estimate the individuals’ heath state3 while previous studies relied on 
previous hospital stays and self-reported health to estimate an individual’s health 
state. We include hospital stays in the previous period in Model II and find no statisti-
cally significant impact. Model XI (Table A 1 in the Appendix) shows that using self-
rated health state, as usually done in previous studies, shows no significant impact. 
Accordingly, this finding suggests that we have access to more detailed health-related 
data compared to existing previous studies. 
Table 2.5 shows the coefficient estimates for the Cohen-Siegelman test for ad-
verse selection. We find that having hospital SuppHI increase the likelihood of suffer-
ing from one of the above defined chronic conditions. This finding is significant on the 
5% level and in line with our adverse selection hypothesis.  
  
                                                                
3
  Actual sickness has been included in the GSOEP in 2009 for the first time. Data on self-
reported health and medical service intensity have been available before. 
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Table 2.5: Cohen-Siegelman Test for Adverse Selection for Individuals Age ≤ 65, 2008 
  Pr(Sick in 2009) 
Variables of Interest 
 
 
 
     Hospital SuppHI 0.0989 ** (0.0481) 
Control Variables 
 
  
     Life insurance 0.0471  (0.0308) 
     Change of SHI provider -0.0810  (0.0589) 
     Household income (log) -0.1369 ** (0.0581) 
     Male -0.1296 *** (0.0312) 
     Age: younger than 25 -0.3878 *** (0.0691) 
     Age: 26-35 -0.3172 *** (0.0462) 
     Age: 46-55 0.3139 *** (0.0387) 
     Age 56-65 0.4885 *** (0.0474) 
     BMI 0.0495 *** (0.0031) 
     Household size -0.0342 ** (0.0144) 
     Risk attitude 0.0265  (0.0831) 
     Risk attitude *income -0.0053  (0.0106) 
     Hospital stay in t-1 0.4033 *** (0.0468) 
     Low level of school 0.0350  (0.0352) 
     High level of school 0.0502  (0.0391) 
     Blue collar worker -0.1135 *** (0.0395) 
     Trainee -0.0367  (0.0793) 
     Unemployed -0.0514  (0.0648) 
     Retired 0.2183 *** (0.0695) 
     No job -0.2463 *** (0.0634) 
     SHI voluntary member 0.0756  (0.0505) 
     SHI family member 0.2404 *** (0.0497) 
     SHI other member 0.0657   (0.0573) 
Observations 9,804 
 
Log Likelihood -5465.7915    
Notes: Standard deviations reported in parentheses. ***,**,* significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels. Reference groups: Age: 36-45, Medium level of school, White-collar 
worker, SHI compulsory member. 
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We subsequently investigate our insurance affinity hypothesis. Holding life in-
surance is highly significant in both lines of SuppHI and has a positive impact, implying 
that holding life insurance increases the demand for hospital and dental SuppHI, re-
spectively. The marginal effect for hospital insurance is 3.16% and 6.32% for dental 
insurance, which is twice as large for dental SuppHI compared to hospital SuppHI. Our 
insurance affinity factor measures whether or not an individual has life insurance, 
which is a purely financial policy. It seems straightforward that it has higher explanato-
ry power for dental SuppHI as this policy closes financial coverage gaps compared to 
the more quality oriented hospital SuppHI. 
The insurance affinity hypothesis is further supported by the fact that having 
changed their SHI provider in the last period increases the likelihood of having both 
types of SuppHI. Individuals who change their sickness fund can be expected to have 
spent some effort in designing their health insurance according to their needs, which 
suggests that they have carefully exploited options to add on to the public coverage. 
With respect to our income hypothesis, logarithmic household income has a 
positive and significant impact on the likelihood of holding hospital SuppHI as shown 
e.g. by Schokkaert et al. (2010) and Kapfer (2008). The marginal effect for a one unit 
increase of the logarithmic household income increases the likelihood of having hospi-
tal SuppHI by 7.38% in the reduced model and 6.34% in the full model. An increase 
from the median income of €3,000 to the 75% percentile (€3,850) increases the likeli-
hood of having hospital SuppHI by 1.84% (Model I) or 1.58% (Model II) respectively.  
Model III and IV illustrate how logarithmic household income affects the de-
mand for dental SuppHI for individuals below 66. Marginal effects are equal to 7.72% 
and 6.96% in the full and the reduced model, respectively. We do not, however, find 
support for our hypothesis that income is a more important driver for quality oriented 
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hospital insurance compared to dental coverage that aims at closing out of pocket 
expenses in our dataset of individuals below 66. 
With respect to the control variables, we see no statistically significant impact 
of gender for hospital benefits in the full model. In Model I, the likelihood of holding 
hospital SuppHI for men is slightly less and significant on the 10% level. This is compa-
rable to Schokkaert et al. (2010) who also do not find a statistically significant impact 
of gender in their full model. With respect to dental benefits, there is a consistent sta-
tistical significance on the 1% level in both models that men are less likely to hold den-
tal SuppHI. We find that younger individuals are statistically significant less likely to 
hold hospital and dental SuppHI which supports the findings of Kapfer (2008). The self-
stated risk attitude is neither for hospital nor for dental SuppHI statistically significant.  
A higher education level increases the likelihood of holding both types of Sup-
pHI as shown by Ettner (1997)4 while the household size decreases the likelihood 
which is different to the Belgian study of Schokkaert et al. (2010). The BMI is statistical-
ly significant on the 10% level for hospital benefits; a higher BMI decreases the likeli-
hood of holding SuppHI. All other control variables are not statistically significant for 
hospital benefits. For dental SuppHI, we see that the demand depends more on socio-
economic factors such as occupational status and not primarily on income. We find 
that unemployed individuals and blue-collar workers are significantly less likely to hold 
dental SuppHI. In addition, family members, who do not have to pay any premiums in 
the SHI system, are less likely to have dental SuppHI. 
 
  
                                                                
4
  These findings are in line with previous studies (see e.g., Berghman and Meerbergen, 2005; 
Kapfer, 2008; Vargas and Elhewaihi, 2008; Schokkaert et al., 2010). 
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Table 2.6 displays the marginal effects for the demand for hospital SuppHI for 
individuals over 65 years of age. As before, we fit Model V with a reduced set of exog-
enous regressors and Model VI including all variables. We do not, however, estimate 
the demand for dental SuppHI for individuals over 65 years as dentures are by far the 
most common way of medical prosthesis.   
Opposing the results for individuals younger than 66, the sickness indicator has 
a negative sign for seniors implying that sicker individuals are less likely to hold SuppHI. 
It is significant on the 10% level in Model V and on the 5% level in the full model (Mod-
el VI). We attribute this change of sign to the hypothesis that private information di-
minishes over the course of a lifetime. For seniors, it can be suspected that most po-
tential conditions have already materialized and therefore, the individual underwriting 
of the insurers will pick them up. Accordingly, we do not find evidence of adverse se-
lection for seniors. We rather confirm Kapfer’s (2008) hypothesis of risk selection by 
the insurers. This finding is also confirmed by the Cohen-Siegelman test where the 
coefficient for holding hospital SuppHI is negative and significant on the 5% level (Ta-
ble 2.7). 
Among seniors, holding life insurance and the change of the SHI provider have 
less explanatory power to predict the demand for hospital SuppHI. The first result can 
be explained by the fact that the life insurance products in Germany are not offered to 
individuals exceeding certain age thresholds. The summary statistics show that indi-
viduals older than 65 are three times less likely to change their SHI provider. Table 2.6 
still shows strong support for our income hypothesis. In addition, the likelihood of 
holding SuppHI decreases with household size as well as low level of schooling for indi-
viduals above 66 years of age. 
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Table 2.6: Probit Regressions on Hospital SuppHI for Individuals Age > 65, 2008 
 
Pr(Hospital SuppHI) 
 
Model V Model VI 
Variables of Interest 
         Household income (log) 0.1166 *** (0.0102) 0.1079 *** (0.0164) 
   Sick2009 -0.0170 * (0.0102) -0.0179 ** (0.0090) 
   Life insurance 
   
0.0211 * (0.0108) 
   Change of sickness fund 
   
-0.0224 
 
(0.0262) 
Control Variables 
         Male -0.0249 *** (0.0090) -0.0233 *** (0.0082) 
   Age: 76-85 0.0011 
 
(0.0105) -0.0039 ** (0.0089) 
   Age: Older than 85 0.0361 
 
(0.0276) 0.0219 * (0.0223) 
   BMI -0.0030 *** (0.0012) -0.0007 
 
(0.0010) 
   Household size 
   
-0.0494 *** (0.0089) 
   Risk attitude 
   
0.01309 
 
(0.0238) 
   Risk attitude*income 
   
-0.0010 
 
(0.0031) 
   Hospital stay in t-1 
   
0.01986 * (0.0117) 
   Low level of school 
   
-0.0791 *** (0.0154) 
   High level of school 
   
0.0080 
 
(0.0130) 
    Blue collar worker 
   
0.1554 
 
(0.1278) 
    Retired 
   
0.03217 * (0.0165) 
    No job 
   
0.10207 
 
(0.1103) 
    SHI voluntary member 
   
0.01921 
 
(0.0228) 
    SHI family member 
   
-0.01771 
 
(0.0169) 
    SHI other member 
   
0.00242 
 
(0.0099) 
Observations 3,030 3,030  
Log Likelihood -751.98 
  
-747.67 
  
Notes: Standard deviations reported in parentheses. ***,**,* significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. Reference groups: Age: 66-75, Medium level of school, White collar worker, SHI compulsory 
member. Occupational categories of trainee and unemployed dropped. 
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Table 2.7: Cohen-Siegelman Test for Adverse Selection for Individuals Age > 65, 2008 
  Pr(Sick2009) 
Variable of Interest 
  
  
   Hospital SuppHI -0.2195 ** (0.0899) 
Control Variables 
 
 
  
   Life insurance 0.0613 
 
(0.0618) 
   Change of SHI provider -0.1293 
 
(0.2003) 
   Household income (log) 0.0199 
 
(0.1034) 
   Male -0.0128 
 
(0.0525) 
   Age: 76-85 0.4205 *** (0.0591) 
   Age: Older than 85 0.2092 * (0.1232) 
   BMI 0.0551 *** (0.0065) 
   Household size -0.0377 
 
(0.0496) 
   Risk attitude -0.0499 
 
(0.1605) 
   Risk attitude *income 0.0055 
 
(0.0212) 
   Hospital stay in t-1 0.2690 *** (0.0669) 
   Low level of school -0.0466 
 
(0.0727) 
   High level of school -0.0452 
 
(0.0982) 
   Blue collar worker -0.2836 
 
(0.3085) 
   Unemployed -1.4183 * (0.8315) 
   Retired -0.0395 
 
(0.2325) 
   No job -0.5150 
 
(0.3179) 
   SHI voluntary member 0.4021 *** (0.1539) 
   SHI family member 0.0837 
 
(0.1505) 
   SHI other member 0.1132 * 0.0607) 
Observations 3,030     
Log Likelihood -1766.1100     
Notes: Standard deviations reported in parentheses. ***,**,* significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels. Reference groups: Age: 66-75, Medium level of school, White collar 
worker, SHI compulsory member. Occupational categories of trainee and unemployed 
dropped. 
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2.6 Robustness of the Results 
We run our regressions on different data subsets in order to assess the robustness of 
our results. In the first subsample, we only include individuals who are mandatory, 
premium paying members in SHI. The full dataset also includes voluntary members of 
SHI who could theoretically opt out of SHI and seek private coverage. As the German 
private health insurance industry does risk-based underwriting, those who remain 
voluntarily in SHI are assumed to be higher risk types on average in their income class. 
Privately insured have to pay premiums for each family member under an individual 
health insurance plan while SHI members can insure spouses and children free of 
charge, if their dependents do not have any earnings, which are subject to social secu-
rity contributions. Staying in SHI as a voluntary member is supposedly attractive to 
large households due to the possibility of insuring non-contributory family members in 
SHI.  
A comparison of means in the subgroup of voluntary insured and other types 
of insurance status in SHI shows that the differences of the means is not significant, 
neither with regard to family size nor to the prevalence of chronic illnesses. Figure 2.2 
underlines these findings and indicates no evidence for selection issues, as the house-
hold size (black dotted line, right axis) does not significantly differ between compulsory 
insured and voluntary members of SHI (columns, left axis). Nor do we find a significant 
increase of chronic diseases (Sick in 2009) (grey line, left axis) among compulsory in-
sured SHI. Furthermore, the figure illustrates that voluntary members in SHI more of-
ten hold supplemental hospital and dental benefits on average compared to other 
types of insurance status in SHI. 
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Figure 2.2:   Share of Enrollees in SuppHI, Household Size, and Chronic Diseases by  
 Insurance Status, 2008 
 
     Source: SOEP v25. 
 
In order to check whether a potential sample selection issue problem may 
skew the results, we created a subsample with only premium-paying, mandatory 
members.  Table 2.8 shows the regressions for hospital (Model VII) and dental SuppHI 
(Model VIII), respectively. In this subset, we dropped the controls for type of employ-
ment as the sample is much more homogenous in this sense. In terms of our adverse 
selection hypothesis, we still find that the sickness indicator is significant on the 10% 
level for hospital insurance, but not significant for dental insurance. The marginal ef-
fect of the sickness indicator for hospital SuppHI is equal to 1.52%, which is relatively 
similar to the effect from the full dataset (1.18%). 
Holding life insurance is significant on the 1% level for hospital and dental in-
surance, the marginal effects equal 3.27% and 7.18%, respectively. This compares to 
3.16% and 6.32%, respectively, in the full dataset. Thus, differences are minimal. The 
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impact of a change of the SHI provider in the previous period remains positive and 
significant compared to the full model for hospital and dental benefits. The marginal 
effect hardly differs in size in both lines of insurance, which equals 4.07% and 8.07%, 
respectively, compared to 2.78% and 6.05% in the full model. We suggest that chang-
ing the SHI provider has a greater impact on the demand for hospital and dental Sup-
pHI for compulsory insured individuals as a change of the SHI provider must be initiat-
ed by the compulsory insured and not by any family members, which are under the 
same coverage. Thus, the fact that a compulsory insured changes the SHI provider 
probably implies that she has actively sought information about the health insurance 
status. In comparison, a family member may simply change the SHI provider as the 
associated compulsory insured has. 
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Table 2.8: Probit Regressions on Hospital and Dental SuppHI - Compulsory Insured 
 
Pr(Hospital SuppHI) Pr(Dental SuppHI) 
 
Model VII Model VIII 
Variables of Interest 
      
Household income (log) 0.0765 *** (0.0170) 0.0924 *** (0.0222) 
Sick in 2009 0.0152 * (0.0080) 0.0143 
 
(0.0105) 
Life insurance 0.0327 *** (0.0071) 0.0718 *** (0.0094) 
Change of SHI provider 0.0407 ** (0.0160) 0.0807 *** (0.0213) 
Control Variables 
      
Male -0.0150 ** (0.0071) -0.0401 *** (0.0095) 
Age: younger than 26 -0.0269 ** (0.0110) -0.0574 *** (0.0150) 
Age: 26-35 0.0088 
 
(0.0100) 0.0084 
 
(0.0134) 
Age: 46-55 -0.0127 
 
(0.0086) -0.0066 
 
(0.0121) 
Age: 56-65 -0.0120 
 
(0.0108) -0.0066 
 
(0.0153) 
BMI -0.0009 
 
(0.0008) 0.0001 
 
(0.0010) 
Household size -0.0207 *** (0.0035) -0.0345 *** (0.0048) 
Risk attitude 0.0047 
 
(0.0258) 0.0176 
 
(0.0335) 
Risk attitude*income -0.0005 
 
(0.0032) -0.0021 
 
(0.0042) 
Hospital stay in t-1 -0.0034 
 
(0.0117) 
   
Low level of school -0.0203 ** (0.0082) -0.0334 ** (0.0111) 
High level of school 0.0340 *** (0.0099) 0.0396 ** (0.0127) 
Observations 6,216   6,216   
Log Likelihood -1,788.66 
  
-669.60 
  
Notes: Standard deviations reported in parentheses. ***,**,* significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Reference groups: Age: 36-45, Medium level of school. 
 
In a second robustness check, we account for the individual’s changing family 
structure by introducing the adjusted household income per family member in the full 
sample. Table 2.9 displays that the impact of per capita income is still significant on the 
1% level for hospital and dental SuppHI. Household size is not significant anymore for 
hospital benefits and significant on the 10% level for dental SuppHI. This allows the 
conclusion that part of the household size impact is now included in the per capita 
income variable. All other estimates have the same significance levels and roughly the 
same size marginal effects. 
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Table 2.9: Probit Regressions on Hospital and Dental SuppHI - Per Capita Income 
 
Pr(Hospital SuppHI) Pr(Dental SuppHI) 
 
Model IX Model X 
Variables of Interest 
      Per capita income (log) 0.0594 *** (0.0112) 0.0606 *** (0.0147) 
Sick in 2009 0.0114 * (0.0061) 0.0104 
 
(0.0078) 
Life insurance 0.0326 *** (0.0055) 0.0646 *** (0.0072) 
Change of SHI provider 0.0286 ** (0.0123) 0.0615 *** (0.0163) 
Control Variables 
      Male -0.0088
 
(0.0059) -0.0269 *** (0.0076) 
Age: younger than 26 -0.0395 *** (0.0088) -0.0535 *** (0.0130) 
Age: 26-35 0.0025 
 
(0.0080) 0.0061 
 
(0.0108) 
Age: 46-55 -0.0127 * (0.0069) -0.0102 
 
(0.0094) 
Age: 56-65 0.0006 
 
(0.0092) 0.0048 
 
(0.0122) 
BMI -0.0011 * (0.0006) 0.0003 
 
(0.0008) 
Household size 0.0035 
 
(0.0042) -0.0096 * (0.0056) 
Risk attitude -0.0172 
 
(0.0158) -0.0215 
 
(0.0204) 
Risk attitude*income 0.0021 
 
(0.0020) 0.0029 
 
(0.0026) 
Hospital stay in t-1 0.0052 
 
(0.0095) 
   Low level of school -0.0217 *** (0.0065) -0.0345 *** (0.0084) 
High level of school 0.0259 *** (0.0076) 0.0084 
 
(0.0092) 
Blue collar worker -0.0090 
 
(0.0072) -0.0208 ** (0.0092) 
Trainee 0.0138 
 
(0.0162) -0.0114 
 
(0.0184) 
Unemployed -0.0070 
 
(0.0139) -0.0402 *** (0.0151) 
Retired -0.0025 
 
(0.0141) -0.0075 
 
(0.0176) 
No job 0.0105 
 
(0.0126) -0.0167 
 
(0.0145) 
SHI voluntary member 0.0100 
 
(0.0090) -0.0034 
 
(0.0114) 
SHI family member -0.0110 
 
(0.0089) -0.0292 ** (0.0115) 
SHI other member -0.0088 
 
(0.0115) -0.0177 
 
(0.0147) 
Observations 9,804   9,804   
Log Likelihood -2,758.47 
  
-3,815.84 
  
Notes: Standard deviations reported in parentheses. ***,**,* significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Reference groups: Age: 36-45, Medium level of school, White-collar worker, SHI compulsory member. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we determine factors that drive the demand for different kinds of SuppHI 
using a very rich dataset. We find that insurance affinity and income have a strong 
positive effect on the demand for SuppHI. Unlike previous studies using GSOEP data 
(e.g., Kapfer, 2008; Schmitz, 2011), we find evidence for adverse selection in SuppHI in 
Germany, when including data on the actual health state of individuals and diseases 
diagnosed by a doctor rather than self-reported health state or doctor visits. This is, 
however, only valid for individuals age 65 and younger. On the contrary, we find sup-
port for the risk selection hypothesis of Kapfer (2008) for individuals aged 66 and old-
er. These findings are line with the assumptions of Peter et al. (2014) that private in-
formation diminishes over time when more and more diseases become apparent. 
When comparing the results for hospital and dental benefits, we find largely the same 
effects. However, we find that the socio-economic status apart from income such as 
occupational status and type of SHI benefits have a significant impact for the demand 
for dental benefits while the demand for hospital coverage primarily depends on in-
come, insurance affinity, household size, and health state. 
The strong dependence of SuppHI demand on income may raise equity or fair-
ness issues concerning access to health insurance and medical care, especially when 
public benefits are further reduced. Up to now, SuppHI in Germany rather comple-
ments and enhances SHI coverage in terms of improved quality, as in the case of sup-
plemental hospital benefits. Supplemental dental insurance does indeed substitute SHI 
benefits, which were cut over time. Our findings imply that comprehensive dental 
benefits are more often covered for higher income individuals. 
Given the recent development in the German health insurance system, we be-
lieve that there is a great potential for market growth in SuppHI. In addition, the ac-
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quired knowledge on the demand for different types of supplemental coverages pro-
vides valuable insights how to design a reformed health care system that partially re-
lies on SuppHI and that aims at ensuring that everyone receives appropriate care. The 
obtained results can be of importance for other countries than Germany. We observe 
that many countries with publicly provided coverage or social health insurance tend to 
cut benefits and incentivize the use of private supplemental coverage. 
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3 Using Experiences from the U.S. to Implement Health 
Savings Accounts in German Statutory Health Insur-
ance5 
3.1 Introduction 
The German health-care system has to cope with several challenges that can be ob-
served worldwide. Rising health-care costs, a high utilization of health services due to 
moral hazard, and the consequences of demographic change put pressure on the fi-
nancing of health expenditures in Germany.6 Various cost-containment policies imple-
mented over the last decades, i.e., spending caps for sectors or individual providers, 
reference prices for pharmaceuticals, reducing the number of hospital beds and re-
stricting the amount of high-cost medical equipment, as well as introducing or increas-
ing co-payments for certain services, were designed to achieve stable premium rates in 
German SHI. However, premiums have increased substantially over recent years and 
there is still a significant solvency problem for SHI. Especially the strong dependence of 
SHI revenues on the development of wages as well as the increasing effect of health 
insurance premiums on incidental wage costs and the associated negative incentives 
on the labor market are widely criticized. Thus, financing of health expenditures has 
been discussed within health sector reform debates over the last decade and was the 
focus of recent reforms.  
Besides cost issues, the current discussion on rationing in health care – ex-
pressed for example by a priority treatment list – supports the argument that there is a 
                                                                
5
  This paper is joint work with Petra Steinorth from St. John’s University New York. The candi-
date’s individual contribution focused mainly on the writing and the literature research. The 
article is printed with kind permission of Schmollers Jahrbuch. It has been originally pub-
lished as Lange, R. and Steinorth, P. (2012). Using Experiences from the U.S. to Implement 
Health Savings Accounts in German Statutory Health Insurance. Doi: 
10.3790/schm.132.1.27. Therefore, the authors thank the two unknown referees for their 
helpful comments. 
6
  Germany spent 10.4% of its GDP on health in 2007, more than the OECD average of 8.9%, 
and Germany’s spending on health per person was 20% higher than the OECD average (see 
OECD, 2009, p 163). Doctors’ consultations per capita counted 7.5 annually compared with 
the 6.8 OECD average (see OECD, 2009; p 91). 
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need for extended individual responsibility in health care. By increasing individual re-
sponsibility, there is the potential to disburden the shared risk pool in SHI and to re-
turn to the original intention of SHI, which is financial protection against cost-intensive 
health risk.   
Although some of the above-described issues are inherent to the German sys-
tem, most industrialized countries face similar challenges. Accordingly, there have 
been intensive discussions and reforms of health-care financing worldwide. One major 
change in financing health-care expenditures was the introduction of Medical Savings 
Accounts (MSAs) in Singapore three decades ago. Since then, MSAs have been adopted 
in several countries as China, South Africa, Hong Kong, USA or their implementation is 
discussed within health sector reform debates i.e. Canada and UK.7 These approaches 
do not only differ in their characteristics but are usually referred to as MSAs if outside 
the U.S. and as Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) if the current approach in the U.S. 
health care market is discussed. 
MSAs are single or family savings accounts from which medical expenses are 
paid and to which contributions are made by individuals or employers (usually tax-
exempt), or by the government. MSAs are accompanied by a High-Deductible Health 
Plan (HDHP), which covers catastrophic medical expenses after the deductible has 
been reached. The goal is to enhance cost-awareness and individual responsibility due 
to increased out-of-pocket payments. By this, moral hazard will be controlled, inducing 
a reduced demand for medical care and the overall medical costs will decrease (see 
e.g. Arrow (1963) and Shavell (1979) on moral hazard). 
However, the objectives for implementing MSAs vary and depend on the spe-
cific structure of the pre-existing health care system. One major aim is to enlist health-
care consumers in controlling costs, but also to stimulate savings for expected high 
                                                                
7
  Hanvoravongchai (2002), Shrott (2002), and Schreyögg (2003) give a good overview on the 
introduction of MSAs in several countries and early experience. 
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costs of medical care in the future in order to reduce the intergenerational burden of 
the financing systems. Furthermore, MSAs pose an opportunity to mobilize additional 
funds for health-care systems (Hanvoravongchai, 2002).    
The aim of our paper is first to analyze the potential of HSAs to improve the cur-
rent situation in SHI and then to design an approach to implement HSAs in the current 
SHI without requiring substantial changes to the system. The introduction of so-called 
Flexible Health Plans (“Wahltarife”) according to § 53 para. 1 Social Security Code V in 
2007 allows insurers in SHI to offer a greater variety of health plans. Accordingly, only 
the latest health-care reform enabled SHI funds to offer more than one health plan 
and thus provides the opportunity to implement HSAs. The focus is on adaptability of 
SHI for two reasons: On the one hand, the possibility to offer products differing from 
universal health coverage for insurers in the SHI market provides an excellent oppor-
tunity to introduce HSAs. On the other hand, the authors strongly believe that HSAs 
can lead to significant cost improvements in SHI. The introduction of significant out-of-
pocket payments will induce the insured to consume medical care in a more conscious 
way and thereby reduce costs. In addition, HSAs potentially increase consumers’ re-
sponsibility in SHI and the competition between SHI and private insurance.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: We describe HSAs in the 
U.S., placing a special focus on implementation details and experiences in the U.S. and 
other countries so far (Section 3.2). In Section 3.3, we first briefly emphasize the suita-
bility of HSAs for the German system (Section 3.3.1) and discuss earlier concepts of 
introducing HSAs to SHI (Section 3.3.2). Based on those results, we develop an ap-
proach in Section 3.3.3 to introducing HSAs to SHI that is consistent with the existent 
system. We refer on the increased flexibility of offering contracts following the intro-
duction of Flexible Health Plans. We also discuss the detailed design, tax subsidies, 
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coverage for families and portability of HSAs. The chapter ends with a summary of the 
results and a short outlook in the conclusion (Section 3.4).  
 
3.2 Health Savings Accounts in the U.S. 
3.2.1 Design of Health Savings Accounts 
In the U.S., most individuals receive employer-sponsored health care coverage. Em-
ployers seek coverage for their employees from commercial or non-profit insurers or 
self-insure their employees. Public programs only insure health risks of the elderly 
(Medicare) and the needy (Medicaid), but universal coverage has not been available so 
far, leaving almost 46 million U.S. citizens uninsured. Recent health care reforms try to 
cope with the latter issue predominantly by extending the Medicaid program; however 
the costs and acceptance of this reform are still unpredictable.  
HSAs are mostly common for individuals without public coverage, as mandated 
Medicare plans or the Medicare Part C Advantage plans for those who contract out 
from Medicare usually do not qualify for establishing and contributing to an HSA. 
However, withdrawals for qualified expenses from an existing HSA are still possible 
under Medicare. We do neglect Medicaid in the following discussion, as Medicaid re-
quires individuals to be below certain income and asset thresholds in order to qualify. 
Accordingly, significant savings in an HSA would prevent eligibility. The following dis-
cussion mostly refers to non-public health insurance contracts, as HSAs are most 
common there.  
In the U.S., MSAs in combination with HDHPs were first authorized by the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. They were first imple-
mented in a demonstration project for the self-employed and workers in small busi-
nesses on a voluntary, employer sponsored basis, and managed by insurance compa-
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nies.8 Passed by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
in 2004, various restrictions were lifted and MSAs, renamed HSAs, were made availa-
ble to the private individual insurance market.  
Insured people are induced to make significant tax-free deposits to their HSA. 
To be eligible to open an HSA, it is mandatory to be covered by an HDHP. Figure 3.1 
displays the current rules for minimum deductibles and maximum out-of-pocket pay-
ments. Above the maximum out-of-pocket threshold insurers refund all medical ex-
penses. Tax-exempt contributions are allowed up to the limits shown in Figure 3.1 and 
can be arranged until enrolling in Medicare9 at the age of 65. In addition, contributions 
can only be made with an existing HDHP, while withdrawals for qualified medical ex-
penses (defined by the IRS) are possible at any time even after terminating an HDHP.10 
Withdrawals used for consumption purposes other than qualified medical expenses 
are also possible; however, the insured have to pay their regular income taxes and an 
additional surcharge of 10% on such expenses. In cases when there are no funds left in 
the HSA, further medical expenses have to be covered by after-tax income (Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), 2009). The tax relief of HSAs also includes earned interest on the 
balance. The balance is interest-bearing and can be invested in the capital market ei-
ther following a pre-specified investment plan or individually. This provides an incen-
tive for financing future health expenditures (Fronstin, 2008). In the case of death, the 
accumulated funds will be transferred into the spouse’s HSA and treated under the 
same conditions. The inheritance of an HSA by a beneficiary other than the spouse 
                                                                
8
  Since 2007 MSAs are also available in Medicare as a type of Medicare Advantage plan, but 
only pay to covered Part A and B services. Medicare Part D is excluded.  A set amount of 
money is contributed annually to the MSA from Medicare, whereas enrollees cannot depos-
it their own money into the account. Due to small market share and few experience, we fo-
cus in our paper on non-Medicare MSAs. (See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
2010). 
9
  Medicare is a statutory health insurance program for elderly and disabled persons.  
10
  Apart from premiums for health insurance. 
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leads to the termination of the HSA and the fair market value of the HSA becomes tax-
able to the heir (IRS, 2009). 
Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the design of HSAs and HSA eligible HDHPs. 
 
Figure 3.1: Design of HSAs and HSA-eligible HDHPs according to IRS Guidelines in 2010 
 
The combination of an HSA with an HDHP creates different incentives. Intro-
ducing high deductibles leads to a reduction of insurance premiums in two ways. On 
the one hand, the premiums are lower as coverage is limited. However, the insurance 
premiums are also reduced due to lower administrative costs and a more cost-
conscious consumption of medical care by the insured. Yet, the insured face a higher 
financial risk since there is less risk-sharing in the case of a high deductible.  HSAs pro-
vide a buffer for this financial risk as the tax-exempt balance will be used to cover the 
deductible, in particular after a sufficient period of time in which reserves could be 
built up. On the other hand, HSAs are assumed to be a powerful instrument for reduc-
ing increasing health-care costs due to moral hazard. In addition, relatively low premi-
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 min. deductible $1,200 $2,400 
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$5,950 $11,900 
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max. withdrawals   
 for qualified medical 
expenses 
up to balance in HSA up to balance in HSA 
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ums for an HDHP might help to increase the overall insurance coverage in the U.S., 
tackling one of the major issues in the U.S. health-care system (Bunce, 2001). 
The individual insurance mandate from the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (PPACA) that will be in place starting 2014 has a great potential to further 
increase the demand for HSAs. One major critique of the PPACA is that the individual 
mandate is enforced by financial penalties for most individuals without health insur-
ance. Those who will not be affected by the increased income threshold to qualify for 
Medicaid can contract low-cost HDHPs and start saving within an HSA which is as-
sumed to be more affordable than traditional insurance coverage. 
 
3.2.2 Experiences from the U.S. 
A steady growth of HDHPs combined with HSAs has been observed in the U.S. market 
since the introduction of HSAs in 2004. The number of people with HDHPs rose from 
438,000 U.S. citizens in 2004 to 11.4 million citizens in 2011. Accordingly, the current 
market share is about 4.3% in the private health insurance market (Yoo, 2005; AHIP, 
2011). Supporters of Consumer-directed Health Plans (CDHPs)11 particularly emphasize 
the potential of HSAs to induce an economical consumption of medical care. Custom-
ers choose consciously adequate medical treatment and also influence physicians to 
provide health care in a more efficient way. Critics fear that HSAs will induce selection 
effects such that primarily healthy individuals with a high income will select CDHPs 
(McNeill, 2004; Buntin et al., 2006; Cannon, 2006; Dixon et al., 2008; Greene et al., 
2008). 
The first surveys of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) based on tax 
data seem to confirm selection (see GAO, 2006; GAO, 2008). Previous work also pro-
                                                                
11
  Consumer-directed Health Plan (CDHP) is the generic term for a HDHP including some sav-
ings option like a HSAs or MSAs. 
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vides evidence that high-income individuals are more likely to choose an HAS (e.g., Lo 
Sasso et al., 2004; Parente et al., 2004a; Parente et al.; 2004b; Tollen et al., 2004; 
Swartz, 2004; Remler and Glied, 2005; Greene et al., 2006; Hoffman and Tolbert, 
2006). 
Tollen et al. (2004) point out the problem of risk segmentation arising from 
employers offering high-deductible or CDHP options alongside more traditional insur-
ance options. They show that employees switching coverage from traditional health 
plans to health plans featuring some HSA characteristics consume significantly less 
medical care and thus tend to be healthier than employees who stay in traditional 
insurance. McNeill (2004) also finds that the healthy, especially young, men are those 
who will benefit most from CDHPs. However, there is also evidence that adverse selec-
tion might not be such an issue, as older and chronically ill individuals will also enroll in 
HSAs due to the reduced premiums, fixed upper limits and tax favors (see Keeler et al., 
1996; Parente et al., 2004a). The ambiguity of the results so far can be partly attribut-
ed to the fact that there is only a small amount of data on HSAs, since they were only 
introduced in 2004. 
Although HSAs are intended to attract uninsured individuals by reduced pre-
miums and tax favors evidence does not seem to support the hypothesis so far. This is 
because primarily low-income individuals and families have no health insurance and 
thus most of them do not face high enough marginal tax rates to benefit from the tax 
deductibility of HSAs. In 2007, about 50% of the uninsured had a gross yearly income 
of $30,000 or less and half of them did not pay taxes at all (Remler and Glied, 2005). 
Low-income individuals are also more likely to have difficulties paying the high deduct-
ible (Hoffman and Tolbert, 2006).  
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Remler and Glied (2006) argue that HSAs significantly increase cost-sharing 
and, thus, must reduce moral hazard issues.12 As mentioned before, high deductibles 
also have the power to reduce administrative costs as the insured are fully responsible 
for all their medical expenses up to the deductible. Accordingly, there will be no ad-
ministrative expenditures until the deductible is reached (Bond, 1999).  
Different surveys have tried to estimate the influence of CDHPs on the overall 
medical costs; however, they reach divergent conclusions. Keeler et al. (1996) forecast 
a change in health costs of +1% to -13% while Nichols et al. (1996) estimate a reduc-
tion of 4% to 15% (depending on different assumptions).13 This surprisingly small po-
tential of CDHPs to reduce costs is – among other reasons – due to the fact that some 
cost-sharing elements have already been implemented in traditional health insurance 
as a consequence of the results of the RAND HIE, which was an experimental study 
from 1974-1982 testing how individuals react to financial incentives like co-insurance 
elements in health plans. In addition, the type of insured people in health plans with 
regard to their spending profile matters. As about 10% of U.S. citizens cause nearly 
57% of all medical costs, those individuals are not very likely to enroll in a CDHP and 
hence the potential of CDHPs to decrease the overall costs is rather limited (Remler 
and Glied, 2006).  
Despite those issues mentioned before, the significant demand for HSAs in the 
U.S. implies that they must have certain beneficial qualities at least for a part of the 
population. After a short overview on further international experience and a descrip-
tion of the particularities of the German health-insurance system we will discuss why 
some of the above-mentioned shortcomings of HSAs as seen in the U.S. will not be a 
major issue when transferring HSAs to German SHI.  
                                                                
12
  Using a theoretical approach, Steinorth (2011) shows that moral hazard will only be de-
creased under certain conditions.  
13
  See Keeler et al., 1996, p 1669; Nichols et al., 1996, p 7 f. Both use Medical Savings Accounts 
(MSAs), the predecessors of HSAs, in their analysis. 
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3.2.3 Experiences from Other Countries 
In Singapore and China, MSAs are an inherent part to finance health expenditures.14  
However, Singapore’s and China’s success of keeping health costs low, which is mostly 
attributed to the introduction of MSAs, must be carefully considered. In the case of 
Singapore, this success is traced back to its social and demographic peculiarities, a 
stringent government, as well as the opacity and different standards of measuring 
data, i.e. health expenditures (Barr, 2001). Also in China, the observed drop in health-
care spending is not solely attributable to MSAs, as the government simultaneously 
imposed fixed remuneration rates to providers and limits on the use of expensive di-
agnostic procedures and pharmaceuticals (Shrott, 2002).   
Whereas Singapore’s MSA system is universal, compulsory, and managed by 
the government, MSAs have been provided by private and public insurers in a number 
of countries to partially finance health expenditures, i.e. USA and South Africa (Hanvo-
ravongchai, 2002; Shrott, 2002; Schreyögg, 2003). Even though implemented in several 
countries over the world, empirical evidence on the efficiency of HSAs and MSAs in 
countries other than the U.S. is relatively scarce. 
In our paper, we concentrate on Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) from the U.S. 
for several reasons: First of all, HSAs in the U.S. are easily integrated in the pre-existing 
system and second, they constitute a voluntary and not compulsory health plan op-
tion. Furthermore, the political environment in the U.S. and Germany are largely com-
parable. As the process of reforming the health-care systems in both countries has 
been a long-lasting challenge, we argue that a solution requiring the least changes to 
the current system is most likely to be adapted. 
                                                                
14
  Since 1984, MSAs (Medisave) are obligatory for all Singaporeans and used to finance their 
immediate medical care expenses. China initiated a pilot study in 1994 of implementing 
MSAs in two cities, expanded the program in 1996 to over 50 cities, and scheduled to in-
clude all urban areas by 1999 (see Hanvoravongchai, 2002; p 24 f). 
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3.3 Implementing Health Savings Accounts in German Statutory 
Health Insurance 
3.3.1 The German Health Insurance System and Health Savings Accounts 
Particularities of the German Health Insurance System 
In contrast to the U.S., the problem of not being able to attract formerly uninsured 
individuals does not play a role in Germany as health insurance is mandatory for eve-
ryone in the dual system of SHI and PHI. Thus, the number of uninsured people is very 
low.  
The fact that people with earnings above the threshold for compulsory insur-
ance can opt out of SHI and switch to PHI distorts the fundamental principle of solidari-
ty within SHI. Therefore, the duality of the health insurance system and the possibility 
for certain groups of people to leave SHI is criticized. In particular, young, healthy and 
single individuals have an incentive to switch to PHI due to comparably low risk–
related premiums, which erodes the income redistribution within SHI.15 It seems plau-
sible that risk segmentation will not occur to the same level as in the U.S. when intro-
ducing HSAs to SHI, since this phenomenon is already inherent to the German health 
insurance system. In contrast, implementing HSAs in SHI might even prevent eligible 
young, healthy and high-income individuals from opting out of SHI. In these cases, 
HSAs are a means to reduce premiums in SHI and increase individual preferences con-
cerning treatment decisions. HSAs may then even contribute to increasing competition 
between SHI and PHI such that the current selection issue may decline, as explained 
later.  
Further distortions between SHI and PHI can be attributed to the compensa-
tion of providers and the reimbursement of medical care. Considerable differences 
                                                                
15
   Kriwy and Mielck (2006) investigate the effect of health and health behavior on the choice 
of insurance (SHI or PHI). They find that healthier people are more likely to be insured under 
PHI than under SHI in Germany (the “selection hypothesis”). 
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between SHI and PHI in terms of remuneration16 lead to biased incentives for physi-
cians to treat privately insured individuals preferentially (e.g., shorter waiting times, 
extensive and more cost-intensive treatments). HSAs could overcome these issues, as 
statutory insured individuals with HSAs pay care providers directly up to the deducti-
ble. In addition, introducing HSAs to SHI allows SHI funds to differentiate themselves 
from competitors, as currently, benefits within SHI hardly vary between the different 
funds, since the list of medical services covered is determined by law and ensures pri-
mary health care.  
The described shortcomings of the German health insurance system have been 
in the focus of several health sector reform debates and recent reforms. Initial point of 
these debates were proposals for introducing a flat rate insurance versus a citizens’ 
health insurance, which intended to broaden the financing basis and reduce inherent 
distortions between SHI and PHI (citizens’ health insurance) or increase competition 
between the two systems while maintaining PHI (flat rate insurance). As our approach 
of implementing HSAs is very flexible, it is also compatible with both reform proposals. 
 
Out of Pocket Payments and Cost Savings Potential in SHI 
So far, cost sharing and out of pocket payments under SHI are not very common and 
capped by law.17  Accordingly, cost sharing is not pronounced under German SHI and 
greater cost savings due to reduced moral hazard can be expected compared to the 
U.S. Overall, it can be expected that the introduction of HSAs to German SHI will lead 
to inherent improvements in German SHI. 
                                                                
16
   Walendzik et al. (2009) find that, for privately insured patients, payment for the same ser-
vice on average exceeds payment for SHI patients by a factor of 2.28.  
17
   Co-payments are limited to €10 per quarter for outpatient services, €10 per quarter for 
dentist visits and per hospital day up to a limit of 28 days.  
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Felder and Werblow (2006) are the first to investigate the impact of an in-
creased cost sharing in SHI and examine how higher deductibles in Flexible Health 
Plans influence the overall health-care costs. They estimate that a €300 deductible on 
top of standard copayments induces significant cost reductions. They disentangle the 
cost savings from selection and behavior changes and show that at minimum 28% of all 
cost savings are due to changes in health-care consumption by the insured. These re-
sults correspond with the RAND HIE, which also showed a significant impact on the 
health-care consumption induced by the level of health-insurance coverage. Accord-
ingly, these facts indicate that there is a considerable potential for cost saving in Ger-
man SHI by further introducing cost sharing and increasing out-of-pocket payments. As 
our approach claims for a higher deductible than the €300 from the Felder and Wer-
blow (2006), we expect further costs savings and a greater impact on utilization as the 
RAND HIE shows.  
One important critique of Flexible Health Plans so far is the relative low catch-
up18 among insured, which may also be due to disadvantageous taxation when choos-
ing a Flexible Health Plan. The rapid growth of tax-incentivized private retirement 
products shows that tax incentives are likely to have a substantial impact on demand. 
In addition, the market response to HSAs in the U.S. has been much higher than the 
catch-up of Flexible Health Plans in Germany, which is probably due to tax incentives. 
Therefore, we expect a much greater market response to HSAs compared to other 
Flexible Health Plans before. Health insurance funds have been reluctant to aggressive-
ly market Flexible Health Plans so far as those have to pay off for themselves. Design-
ing a product that can attract a significant market share would also increase the inter-
                                                                
18
  In 2010 only 395.538 individuals in SHI chose a (deductible) Flexible Health Plan which 
equals about 0.6% of insured (German Ministry of Health, 2011). 
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est of health insurance funds to engage in that market as they mostly compete in 
terms of market share. 
 
3.3.2 Previous Proposals for Implementing Health Savings Accounts in German 
Statutory Health Insurance 
The Concept of HSAs in Statutory Health Insurance following Schreyögg 
Different proposals and approaches for implementing HSAs in Germany have been 
discussed over the last few years. Schreyögg (2003) proposes to introduce income-
dependent deductibles to SHI.19 In addition, mandatory HSAs are installed and the 
insured have to make a fixed and tax-free monthly contribution from their gross in-
come. The annual contributions equal the maximum yearly deductible.20 Medical care 
is financed either via reimbursements to the insured or according to the principle of 
benefits in kind depending on the price elasticity of a treatment. All price-elastic 
treatments are paid directly by the insured up to the deductible. Price-elastic treat-
ments above the deductible and non-price-elastic treatments are reimbursed directly 
to the supplier following the principle of benefits in kind.  
However, the proposal of Schreyögg (2003) does not consider the increasing 
competition between SHI and PHI in Germany as our proposal does. By making an 
HDHP mandatory, the competitive advantage of private insurance will increase due to 
the fact that private health insurers are much less regulated in regard to the contracts 
they offer. Thus, income-dependent deductibles can induce the insured above the 
income threshold to switch to PHI.  
                                                                
19
   Deductibles will be either €600 or €1200 depending on whether the insured individual 
meets a certain income threshold. Low-income individuals as well as chronic patients and 
children are exempt from deductibles. 
20
   Accordingly, contributions will either be €50 or €100 depending on whether an individual is 
below or above the income threshold. 
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HSAs as a Third Column to Finance Health-care Expenses following Spreemann 
Spreemann (2003) describes a model for the German health-insurance system that 
could be conceivable as a third column to cover health expenses besides the SHI and 
PHI. Individuals use so-called “Personal Health Accounts” (PHAs) to pay for health ex-
penses. Having a PHA releases them from compulsory insurance under SHI. The core of 
the model consists of two components: a tax-favored savings account and a cata-
strophic insurance covering extremely high medical expenses. Funds in the account 
accumulate through regular minimum fees (10% of the gross wage), which are shared 
equally by employers and holders of PHAs until a target balance is met. Once the tar-
get balance is reached no further contributions are necessary due to the fixed interest 
rate of funds. If the capital in the PHA falls below the target balance as a consequence 
of increased use of medical services, contributions to the PHA become necessary 
again. Regularly, funds in the PHA are used to cover all medical expenses. However, 
extremely high medical costs in the price-inelastic area, which financially overburden 
the PHA, are covered by complementary catastrophic insurance. Premiums for this 
catastrophic insurance have to be paid monthly as a lump sum. Tax exemption of con-
tributions and interest subsidize PHAs. Once having opted out of the existing health-
insurance system and having established a PHA, the possibility of returning to other 
insurance options is very limited as holders of PHAs avoid interpersonal and intergen-
erational subsidization in SHI (Spreemann, 2003).   
Subsequently, the introduction of PHA to the German health insurance system 
could cause adverse selection. On the one hand, particularly “(…) young and health-
conscious people who are ready to take over responsibility, who think and act eco-
nomically, and want to be independent (…)” will prefer PHAs to traditional health in-
surance (Spreemann, 2003). On the other hand, PHAs constitute a form of self-
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insurance discriminating low-income and chronically ill individuals. Thus, they are hard-
ly in line with the principle of redistribution in the German health insurance system.          
 
Mandatory HSAs in Statutory Health Insurance following Neubauer 
The third concept follows Neubauer (2006), proposing savings accounts for all people 
insured under SHI. In combination with a low deductible, contributions to the savings 
account should be voluntary at the beginning. Similar to the concept of HSAs in the 
U.S., funds from the savings account cover medical expenses up to the deductible. The 
aim is to implement a partial capital covered system for the insured in the SHI in the 
medium term that might absorb demographic risk in the pay-as-you-go financed SHI 
system in the long run. A reduction of costs induced by insurance and by lower admin-
istrative costs is one advantage of implementing savings accounts in the SHI (Neubau-
er, 2006). Implementing savings accounts for medical expenses further offers the op-
portunity to build up ageing reserves on an individual level within the collectively fi-
nanced SHI. Furthermore, building up capital reserves on an individual basis (in a sav-
ings account) can alleviate switching between SHI and PHI when the PHA can be used 
to compensate for missing ageing reserves under SHI. This may induce competition 
between the two systems. Therefore, moving back from PHI into SHI may also be pos-
sible by rolling over ageing reserves into the savings account. One of Neubauer’s major 
concerns is the possibility of risk selection, when particularly young individuals with a 
high income, who primarily subsidize sick and poor individuals insured in SHI, reduce 
their premiums due to the deductible and decrease solidarity within the statutory sys-
tem. This might be intensified by the peculiarity of the German health-insurance sys-
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tem as premiums in the SHI are income-related and not determined by risk (Neubauer, 
2006). 21 
The concept of implementing HSAs in German SHI in combination with Flexible 
Health Plans, as presented in this paper,22 requires the smallest intervention in the 
existing German health-insurance system compared with the previously discussed 
models. At the same time, it aims to provide the same benefits as the other approach-
es. In contrast to Neubauer (2006), neither establishing an HSA is mandatory for the 
insured, nor are there fixed contributions to the HSA as in Schreyögg ’s and Spree-
mann’s models. Subsequently, consumers are more conscious and independent in 
choosing adequate health-insurance coverage in the authors’ view, which may result in 
increased competition between the two German health-insurance systems.   
 
3.3.3 Implementing Health Savings Accounts in German Statutory Health In-
surance  
Health Savings Accounts following Flexible Health Plans  
Flexible Health Plans provide the legal foundation for easily implementing HSAs in 
combination with deductible health plans in SHI. Deductible health plans are usually an 
instrument of PHI, but since 2007 SHI funds are allowed to offer deductibles within 
optional Flexible Health Plans. The aim of these Flexible Health Plans is to increase the 
insured individual’s freedom of choice within the SHI, sustain transparency, and en-
courage competition between the different SHI funds as well as between SHI and PHI 
(Schulze-Ehring and Weber, 2007). 
                                                                
21 
 Schulze-Ehring and Weber (2007) analyze critically the differences in premiums of deducti-
ble health plans in SHI and PHI. 
22   
 Schreyögg (2003) and Pütz (2004) discuss the implementation of savings accounts on the 
basis of Flexible Health Plans. 
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As premiums for German SHI are income-dependent, deductible health plans under 
SHI include a bonus payment fixed within income classes and disbursed to the insured 
as she bears medical expenses (at least partially) that are usually covered by SHI. The 
statutory period of commitment in the health plan is three years.    
The advantage of implementing HSAs on the basis of Flexible Health Plans un-
der SHI is that no annihilation or extensive alteration of the existing German health-
insurance system is necessary. HSAs can be one option within Flexible Health Plans. 
HSAs can, thus, be easily introduced within the legal and institutional framework. SHI 
will benefit from the previously mentioned positive effects of HDHPs, e.g., a reduction 
in premiums due to a reduction in moral hazard, a decrease in overall medical expens-
es and thus a reduction in the intergenerational reallocation of funds within SHI 
(Scheyögg, 2003). Combining HDHPs with HSAs offers further advantages: first, HSAs 
absorb the financial risk inherent to deductibles, thus making even high deductibles 
affordable for low-income individuals. Secondly, in comparison with pure deductibles, 
they reduce the incentive to delay necessary care due to the savings in the HAS (Pütz, 
2004). Furthermore, offering HSAs in combination with deductibles in SHI has the po-
tential to increase the acceptance of Flexible Health Plans in Germany, if insured peo-
ple are allowed to finance those tax-exempt in an HSA. Introducing new health-
insurance options under SHI can increase the attractiveness of the different funds and 
raise their position in competing for the insured.     
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Figure 3.2: Traditional SHI and HSAs 
 
Figure 3.2 displays how HSAs fit into the traditional SHI system. Without HSAs, 
relations are marked in black while grey arrows display a Flexible Health Plan with 
HSAs. In the traditional approach, the insured pay their fixed insurance premium to 
their SHI fund, which reimburses medical providers for medical services delivered to 
the insured. Service flows are marked by dotted arrows while continuous arrows dis-
play cash flows. Adding HSAs to the system implies that the SHI fund only reimburses 
the provider above the deductible while the insured are responsible for reimburse-
ment below the deductible. If the balance in their HSA suffices, they can pay the pro-
viders from their HSAs, otherwise they have to use other personal funds.    
 
Deductibles 
When implementing HSAs in the German market it has to be ensured that the HDHP 
and contributions to an HSA are in an economical relation. Felder and Werblow (2006) 
show that even a small deductible has a substantial impact on health-care consump-
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tion. Furthermore, a recent study on optional deductibles within Flexible Health Plans 
in SHI concluded that participants of optional deductibles have a lower health care 
costs (284€) than the reference group (Hemken et al., 2011). As the RAND HIE shows 
that higher out-of-pocket expenses increase the induced behavioral change compared 
to full insurance, we propose a sufficiently great deductible in order to induce substan-
tial behavioral changes of insured people as well as of suppliers (Newhouse et al., 
1993). Among the available Flexible Health Plans in the German market, deductibles 
are sometimes so low that they will be exceeded after a few visits to a physician or one 
stay in a hospital. Yet, there is no explicit regulation concerning the maximum deducti-
ble that can be offered in Germany. However, the law forbids SHI funds from disburs-
ing a bonus payment of more than 20% of yearly premiums or €600 (Ulrich et al., 
2008). This implicitly determines the maximum deductible (see § 53 subs. 8 Social Se-
curity Code V). The existing deductible health plans in SHI are solely dependent on 
income, which will somehow adjust the deductible to the bonus payment and guaran-
tee to some extent that insured individuals are likely to finance the deductible (Pütz, 
2003). However, this approach has led to some cases where deductibles are very low 
(around €100) and significant changes in health-care consumption cannot be expected. 
Introducing HSAs will provide individuals with an incentive to save for future health-
care costs and might, thus, allow higher deductibles. Accordingly, the minimum de-
ductible should not fall below €1,000, as in the U.S. and Switzerland (IRS, 2009; Wer-
blow, 2002),23 while cost sharing above this deductible can also be implemented.24 In 
order to implement substantial deductibles, a change in law is required. Also, the max-
                                                                
23
  Felder and Werblow (2002) show a decrease in medical consumption of about two-thirds 
when increasing deductibles to 1,200 and 1,500 sFr. 
24
  However, German law limits maximum out-of-pocket payments for individuals insured in 
SHI to 2% of gross income. As individuals are fully subject to social insurance contributions if 
their annual gross income exceeds €9,600, the maximum possible deductible in their case 
would only be €192. Under this law, a social graduation of deductibles would automatically 
be implemented. 
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imum for bonus payments must be increased to be able to offer behavior-changing 
deductibles.  
 
Health Savings Accounts and the Reimbursement of Medical Expenses in  
German SHI 
Combining HSAs and deductible health plans is supposed to stimulate individuals to 
use medical care more consciously (Buntin et al., 2006; Dixon et al., 2008). In order to 
achieve changes in the insured’s behavior through a deductible, it is necessary for pa-
tients to be sufficiently informed about the costs and benefits of different treatments. 
This requires medical costs to be billed directly to the patient and then to be reim-
bursed by the insurer. This is contradictory to the principle of benefit in kind inherent 
to German SHI, as patients can use medical services without being directly charged by 
the provider, as demonstrated in figure 3.2. Remuneration is exclusively conducted 
between the SHI funds and the providers, leaving the insured without any information 
about the costs of treatment. 
Concerning the present deductible plans, SHI funds use accounting models 
that counterbalance the costs of all used services up to the deductible and the bonus 
payment, which the insured receive dependent on their income. Due to the difficulty 
of breaking down the cost of every treatment, SHI funds use lump sums for pricing 
dental and out-patient treatment (with prescriptions). Subsequently, these lump sums 
do not reflect the actual consumption of resources and thus fail to establish complete 
transparency of costs. Hence, an exact allocation of costs is inevitable to induce chang-
es in behavior through deductibles.        
In order to avoid biased incentives and to guarantee straightforward and fast 
compensation, implementing HSAs within Flexible Health Plans is only reasonable 
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when the insured choose reimbursement of medical expenses.25 We are aware of the 
fact that reimbursement of medical expenses causes higher administrative costs. As 
argued in the U.S., deductible health plans reduce administrative costs since the in-
sured are solely responsible for medical costs below the deductible (Bond, 1999). Any 
expenses below the deductible do not have to be administered by the SHI fund and do 
not cause any costs. The skewness of distribution of medical expenses supports the 
significance of the latter argument, as for instance in the U.S. five percent of the popu-
lation accounted for almost half of the medical expenses (49%) in 2004 (Stanton and 
Rutherford, 2006). Health expenditure profiles in German SHI also show that insured in 
the age of 20 to 40 consume medical care for around €1,000 per year (Niehaus and 
Finkenstaedt, 2009). Because of the extreme skewness of medical expenses, as for 
many age groups, average medical spending is in the range of the deductible and due 
to the induced reduced utilization, we estimate that a substantial portion of individuals 
do not file any claims with their SHI funds in an average year. This should compensate 
for higher costs caused by reimbursement of medical expenses above the deductible. 
Thus, the implementation of HSAs in combination with deductibles in the German 
health-insurance market should be combined with reimbursement of medical costs 
rather than benefits in kind in order to have a substantial effect on the reduction of 
administration costs below the deductible and create the right incentives for utiliza-
tion.  
 
Deposits to and Withdrawals from Health Savings Accounts  
Due to the particularities of German SHI, we suggest that contributions to HSAs are 
only possible from obtained bonus payments in Flexible Health Plans. This will auto-
                                                                
25
   Already, now, it is possible to choose reimbursement of medical costs rather than benefits 
in kind. However, this option has to be explicitly chosen by the insured and is not yet very 
common. 
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matically lead to a situation with yearly contributions to an HSA going below the yearly 
deductible, which guarantees that HSAs will not be used as tax shelters. However, after 
some time this so-called donut hole can easily be covered by the accrued balance of 
the HSA.  
The actual savings26 will be on a voluntary basis as the introduction of Flexible 
Health Plans aimed to increase consumers’ choices. Mandatory savings do not comply 
with those aims (Pütz, 2004). The incentives for savings are provided by tax favors. As 
the balance of an HSA can only be used for medical expenses this narrows consumers’ 
choice of how to spend the money compared with deductible health plans without 
HSAs. This will again be compensated for by the tax incentives. To earmark the balance 
of an HSA for medical costs also seems reasonable as out-of-pocket payments have 
increased in SHI over the last few years.  
The balance of an HSA will be invested in the capital markets, e.g., by a coop-
eration partner of the SHI fund. According to government-funded pension schemes, 
financial institutions require certification to offer HSAs. We are aware of the fact that 
cooperation between German SHI funds and private institutions must be strictly regu-
lated. Yet, the German private pensions (so-called “Riester”) contracts provide a good 
example of a successful collaboration between financial institutions and the public 
sector. Furthermore, experiences from U.S. show that such cooperation works in the 
field of HSAs. Accordingly, we propose that the HSAs should be handled by private 
financial institutions. This also includes a check that their customers are allowed to 
receive tax subsidies only in cases where the insured have an HDHP. It is crucial that 
the insured are constantly enabled to obtain information on their balance and with-
drawals at all times. In addition, the insured will receive compulsory information on 
their balance once a year.  
                                                                
26
  Accumulation of bonus payments. 
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On the one hand, withdrawals will be possible to finance the deductible. On the other 
hand, financing health care that is not covered under SHI will be possible from an HSA, 
i.e. on the secondary health market. This includes treatments that are completely ex-
cluded from SHI coverage and also upgrading treatments, e.g. patented drugs or laser 
tonsillectomies. In the case of higher-value services, only the gap between the costs 
the SHI usually reimburses for such a treatment and the actual price has to be paid 
from the HSA, the remainder will be covered by SHI. This will lead to greater freedom 
of treatment choice for individuals insured under SHI and will potentially decrease 
implicit rationing in SHI. 
 
Tax Favors for Health Savings Accounts 
In the following section we discuss how the above-described concept of HSAs can be 
implemented in German taxation. Under the German tax system, health-insurance 
premiums were partly tax-exempt up to a threshold until October 2010.27 Starting in 
October 2010 all health-insurance premiums are tax-exempt up to the level of medical 
care that is provided by SHI. Accordingly, part of the insurance premiums for PHI is not 
tax-exempt, if a higher level of care is provided than in SHI. However, if people insured 
under SHI receive bonus payments for reducing their coverage, they have to pay taxes 
on these payments. This will create incentives to choose an HDHP with an HSA where 
contributions are tax-exempt rather than having an HDHP without an HSA. Arguments 
for the tax exemption in HSAs can easily be found as the deposited money will be used 
to cover medical expenses.  
At present, enrolling into a Flexible Health Plan under German SHI leads to a 
lower tax exemption as the bonus payment is taxed. On the aggregate level, enrolling 
                                                                
27
  In 2009, this threshold was €2,400, which also includes premiums for long-term care insur-
ance, unemployment insurance, personal liability insurance and accident insurance.  
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into a Flexible Health Plan thus implies higher tax revenues. As mentioned before, we 
propose to use these higher tax revenues to be reinvested and to create tax incentives 
to contribute to an HSA. If the insured can carry forward the full tax exemption under 
full coverage to a HDHP with a HSA, there will be no extra cost occurring in order to 
create incentives to switch to a tax exempt HSA. This rather remedies the tax disad-
vantages from choosing a Flexible Health Plan than creating further public costs.   
The balance of HSAs will – as described before – be invested in the capital 
markets. To obtain a certain security level a minimum amount of interest will be guar-
anteed, as is usual in German life insurance. The earned interest will also be tax-
exempt, which will further increase the demand for HSAs compared with standard 
deductible contracts. As capital gains are also tax-exempt until a certain threshold in 
general, not taxing the earnings on HSAs can intensify anti-selection as only individuals 
with capital earnings above this threshold will benefit.28  
To reduce the remaining selection issues and to increase the demand for HSAs 
for lower-income individuals as well, we suggest that individuals can either choose tax-
exempt contributions to their HSAs or receive a fixed tax subsidy on their HSA balance 
(Neubauer, 2006). Such a choice has been very successfully implemented in German 
“Riester” contracts where individuals can also choose to receive either tax exemption 
or a fixed subsidy. This will guarantee that all individuals – regardless of income – can 
benefit from the tax favors in HSAs and will reduce selection issues. Introducing a tax 
subsidy for low income risk would of course impose additional costs for the tax payers. 
However, Corneo et al. (2007) show that an increase of the tax subsidies does not sig-
nificantly increase the number of low-income individuals as well as their savings ratio 
in case of the Riester retirement plans. Accordingly, expected costs of introducing a 
subsidy for low-income individuals are not expected to be excessive. 
                                                                
28
   See Table B 1 in Appendix B. 
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To increase flexibility for HSA holders and, thus, to make HSAs more appealing, 
we allow withdrawals for purposes other than medical expenses, as in the U.S. model. 
This is particularly important in situations of financial need, e.g. due to the loss of a 
job. However, tax subsidies have to be paid back or the current balance will be subject 
to income tax when not used for medical costs, depending on the tax favor chosen 
before. Otherwise, individuals could abuse HSAs for general savings rather than saving 
for medical expenditures. In the U.S., consumption withdrawals from HSAs are also 
subject to a penalty tax, if the balance is used for non-medical consumption.29 There-
fore, we propose that individuals have to pay for increased administrative costs if they 
decide to withdraw money for non-medical consumption. However, these additional 
fees will be redeemed when individuals have reached a certain age as in the U.S.  
 
Health Savings Accounts for Families 
As mentioned before, we strongly support the thesis that families that only have a 
conjoint health insurance plan must have a higher minimum deductible in their HDHP. 
Otherwise, families are more likely to reach the minimum deductible and, thus, HSAs 
will become less attractive to them. Accordingly, the treatment of all the family mem-
bers who are subsumed under one insurance contract will account for the joint de-
ductible. However, we suggest that treatments for minors will be excluded from that in 
order to secure that children will receive sufficient medical treatment in all cases. This 
is also consistent with German regulation so far as there are no out-of-pocket pay-
ments for underage persons (§ 28 para. 4 Social Security Code V). However, if one or 
both parents do have an HSA they will also be eligible to use their balance for the med-
ical treatment of their children, which might not be covered by SHI.    
                                                                
29
  However, this penalty tax will be redeemed when individuals are older than 65 and are 
under Medicare. 
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In the case of a conjoint health-insurance contract for married couples, the 
spouses can decide to open a conjoint HSA as well. The HDHP will then have a mini-
mum deductible that will equal double the minimum deductible for a single person, 
comparable with the U.S. As non-working married individuals without their own in-
come are co-insured under their spouse’s SHI for free, the insurance premium will be 
equal to the premium of a single person. However, families with an HSA must receive 
higher bonus payments due to higher deductibles in order to compensate for that. If 
both spouses have their own insurance contract, both spouses must have the oppor-
tunity to open single HSAs. In order to avoid financial discrimination against working 
couples, both spouses should have the opportunity to finance their spouse’s medical 
expenditures from their HSA. 
 
Portability of Health Savings Accounts in the Case of Death, Divorce, Change of 
Health Plan, Switching within Statutory Health Insurance or Switching to Private 
Health Insurance  
To enhance the market for HSAs the accrued balance must be inheritable. A spouse or 
life partner will be able to decide whether to continue the existing HSA, to transfer the 
balance of their dead spouse’s or partner’s HSA to their own HSA if they have one or 
simply to bequeath the balance of an HSA. If the funds of an HSA are not continued as 
or transferred to an HSA, the tax favors must be paid back and the balance will be 
taxed. In the case of a divorce, the balance of an HSA has to be divided between the 
two ex-spouses according to the divorce settlement. Ex-spouses can decide whether 
they want to either continue single HSAs or use the money for other consumption pur-
poses. In the latter case they have to pay back the received tax favors and pay the ad-
ditional administrative fee when younger than 65.  
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However, the balance of an HSA will still be available even after quitting an 
HDHP and returning to other insurance plans regardless of whether the new plan is 
under SHI or PHI. The balance can still be used to pay for medical treatments that are 
not included in the new health plan and for out-of-pocket expenses.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
HSAs have been successfully introduced in several countries and have been accepted 
by insurers as well as by insured people to the same degree. Our paper investigates 
whether the introduction of tax-favored HSAs to German SHI is possible and desirable. 
We developed an approach that is compatible with the existing SHI system in Germa-
ny, building on the newly defined Flexible Health Plans. Contrasting previous proposals 
to implement HSAs in German SHI our approach requires the smallest changes to the 
existing system and allows the greatest freedom to customers when arranging their 
health insurance. Therefore, we analyze the particularities of German SHI as well as 
financial and fiscal aspects.  
By implementing HSAs as proposed here, the insured consume health care in a 
more conscious way. On the one hand, the insured receive more information on the 
actual treatment costs. On the other hand, the high deductible reduces moral hazard. 
Altogether, there will be a more price-elastic demand for medical care as long as the 
insured have not reached the deductible, which is likely to lead to an overall cost re-
duction. The greater financial risk that is imposed on the insured due to the HDHP will 
be reduced by the accrued balance in an HSA. Accordingly, HSAs increase incentives at 
least partially to self-insure. This will lead to a greater private responsibility for health 
care and more consumer-directed health care.  
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The increased co-determination of the insured and possible cost reductions 
have the potential to enhance competition between SHI and PHI. The combination of 
an HSA with an HDHP will be particularly interesting to individuals who are planning to 
leave SHI due to the lower prices and greater freedom of choice in PHI. Accordingly, 
the focus of our paper is on how HSAs can be implemented in SHI. However, to ensure 
competitive fairness, tax favors for HSAs when combined with an HDHP must also be 
available under PHI. Proposing how CDHPs can be arranged for PHI is a promising 
scope for further investigations into how HSAs fit into the German health-insurance 
system.  
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4 Medicaid Managed Care and the Market for Private 
Health Insurance30 
4.1 Introduction 
Ongoing concerns about the increasing number of uninsured and increasing spending 
on health care services have prompted a variety of public policy responses in the U.S. 
Typically, the government’s role in insurance markets is that of a regulator and moni-
tor of insurer performance. In some cases, however, the government is involved as a 
safety net to promote indemnification of (1) individuals (or companies) facing risks the 
private market deems uninsurable, (2) those who may be unable to secure coverage in 
the standard way, and (3) those for whom private insurance coverage is not afforda-
ble. The most recent health reform in the U.S. suggests an increasing role of the feder-
al government in providing insurance coverage is therefore likely to affect the health 
care and health insurance market.31 
Government involvement in the provision of health care significantly affects 
many market participants. Direct effects of an expansion of health insurance became 
evident after the introduction of Medicare, which constituted the largest change in 
health insurance coverage in the U.S. as, for example, hospital spending increased 
disproportionally after the introduction of that new insurance system for the elderly 
(Finkelstein, 2007). In addition to these direct effects, governmental health insurance 
activities and the respective implementation may also indirectly affect existing private 
                                                                
30
  This paper is joint work with Patricia Born from Florida State University and Jörg Schiller 
from the University of Hohenheim. The candidate’s contribution mainly focused on the 
structure of the paper, the literature research, and the writing. The paper was presented to 
several international audiences (e.g., ARIA Annual Meeting 2013) and submitted to Health 
Economics, Policy and Law for publication.  
31
  Medicaid expansions and the formation of state-based health insurance exchanges are the 
key provisions of the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and are 
designed with the intention to extend health insurance coverage to the uninsured. A sum-
mary of the major provisions of PPACA can be found on the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services website at www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/timeline/timeline-text.html. 
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health insurance markets if compensation of health care providers varies for different 
consumer groups. In 2013, the cost of “uncompensated care” provided to uninsured 
individuals in the U.S. was estimated at $84.9 billion. According to Coughlin et al. 
(2014), government sources provided $53.3 billion in payments to providers to help 
offset these costs. However, $10.5 billion was provided by office-based physicians as 
charity care, and about $21.1 billion were mainly financed by private insurance in the 
form of higher payments which yield to premium increases. Although the extent is 
controversial (Stoll, 2005; Dobson et al., 2006; Hadley et al., 2008), these numbers 
suggest that cost-shifting activities of health care providers might significantly affect 
premiums of privately insured enrollees. As provider compensation from public pro-
grams, like Medicaid or Medicare, is in general substantially lower than that from pri-
vately insured, these programs may lead to higher premiums in the private market. 
Given the identified cost-shifting activities on the provider level, a comprehensive pic-
ture about the impact on private health insurance premiums is still missing. 
Private health insurance in the U.S. has experienced turbulent times over the 
last few decades - the rise of and backlash against managed care, the erosion in em-
ployer-sponsored coverage, and enrollment losses - altogether leading to double-digit 
premium increases. The profitability downturn has induced two major effects: exten-
sive consolidations in the health insurance industry and private health insurers’ altered 
interest in public-sector lines of business (Robinson, 2006). Medicaid is the public 
health insurance program for eligible low-income individuals and families in the U.S. It 
is jointly funded by the federal and state governments but administered by the states 
only. Medicaid programs, therefore, vary significantly across states with regard to eli-
gibility, services covered, and the degree to which private health insurance can partici-
pate through Medicaid managed care. 
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In this paper, we evaluate how premiums in the U.S. private health insurance 
market relate to the design and extent of government provided health insurance. In 
particular, by looking at insurer level data for the U.S. market from 2001 to 2009, we 
consider how the Medicaid program is related to premiums for private health insur-
ance coverage in the comprehensive business line. As private insurers can take an ac-
tive role in Medicaid for some states, we distinguish between states that allow insurers 
to enroll Medicaid beneficiaries in commercial managed care organizations (MCOs) 
and states that solely operate Medicaid through their state’s Medicaid agency in a 
state-run environment. We find that a greater Medicaid population and higher utiliza-
tion of Medicaid MCOs increases premiums in private health insurance if states open 
Medicaid to commercial insurers but private insurers do not participate in the Medi-
caid business. Private insurers that operate in a state-run Medicaid environment and 
those who participate in Medicaid are less affected by the extent of the public pro-
gram in terms of premium increases.   
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide some institu-
tional background on Medicaid managed care. In Section 4.3, we give a review on the 
literature and develop our predictions. In Section 4.4, we describe the data and meth-
odology for our analysis. Our results are presented and discussed in Section 4.5. A final 
section concludes. 
 
4.2 Medicaid Managed Care 
Medicaid plays an integral role in financing health care services in the U.S., accounting 
for 15 percent of total national health expenditures in 2011 (CMS, 2013).  According to 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS, 2011), the federal-state Medi-
caid program provides health insurance coverage and long‐term care assistance to 
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about 57 million low-income individuals, elderly, and persons with disabilities. States 
establish and administer their own Medicaid programs within broad federal guidelines, 
but financing is shared by states and the federal government (Gruber, 2003). Each 
state determines how the program is organized and administered, decides what medi-
cal benefits are covered, and establishes specific eligibility rules which must also meet 
mandatory minimum federal requirements (Smith et al., 2008; Bitler and Zavodny, 
2014).  
Throughout the 1990s, as many states pursued waivers to undertake eligibility 
expansion and to restructure their Medicaid financing and delivery systems, several 
state Medicaid programs converted their compensation schemes from a traditional 
fee-for-service model into a variety of managed care arrangements (Holahan et al., 
1995; Hurley and Draper, 2002). The most commonly used type of Medicaid managed 
care arrangements are comprehensive risk-based plans where state Medicaid agencies 
contract with MCOs paying them a fixed per member per month payment (capitation) 
to provide all or a defined set of Medicaid-covered services.32 Prepaid arrangements 
offer states predictable cost increases, control of program costs, and provide them 
with an opportunity to shift administrative efforts and expenses to private plans. In 
return, states would accept restricted networks and different forms of care manage-
ment for guaranteed access for Medicaid beneficiaries (NAIC, 1996; Herring and Ad-
ams, 2011; Hurley and Draper, 2002). However, findings are mixed as to whether mov-
ing Medicaid recipients to managed care plans reduces Medicaid expenditures and 
increases program efficiency (Duggan, 2004; Duggan and Hayford, 2013; Herring and 
Adams, 2011). Furthermore, this remuneration scheme puts networks of providers and 
                                                                
32
  Other types of Medicaid managed care arrangements are primary care case management 
(PCCM) programs and limited-benefit plans, i.e., prepaid inpatient health plans (PIHPs) or 
prepaid ambulatory health plans (PAHPs). 
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private insurers at financial risk and holds them accountable for the quality of care 
they provide to Medicaid enrollees.  
The degree to which Medicaid has transitioned into a managed care-based 
program was initially been promoted by the growth of managed care in private health 
insurance and commercial plans’ willingness to integrate Medicaid into their business 
portfolio. Private insurers entered the Medicaid market predominantly to grow mem-
bership for market positioning purposes and to gain increased negotiating leverage 
with network providers (Hurley and Draper, 2002). However, distinctive features of 
Medicaid managed care, i.e. intermitted eligibility among beneficiaries or the expan-
sion of existing networks to incorporate traditional Medicaid providers to respond to 
state agency and consumer preferences (Hurley and McCue, 2000), did not increase 
commercial plans’ negotiating leverage, but rather increased administrative costs and 
affected insurer profitability (Hurley and Somers, 2003). As a result, predominantly 
private insurers’ participation in Medicaid managed care flattened after its peak in 
1998. This trend was emphasized by regulations that emanated from the Balanced 
Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 which gave state Medicaid programs new authority to man-
date managed care enrollment without a waiver. Furthermore, it eliminated Medi-
caid’s longstanding “75/25” rule, which required 25 percent of a Medicaid plan’s en-
rollment to be commercially insured. This change paved the way for the emergence of 
Medicaid-dominated and Medicaid-only managed care plans.33 Consequently, enroll-
ment in Medicaid-only MCOs has climbed steadily after the issue of BBA in 2002 from 
43 percent to 58 percent in 2011 (CMS, 2011). Since 2006, the share of Medicaid bene-
ficiaries enrolled in Medicaid-only MCOs has exceeded Medicaid enrollment in com-
mercial plans. A similar trend can be observed with respect to the number of commer-
                                                                
33
  Many of these MCOs are owned by safety-net hospitals while others are run by multi-state, 
publicly traded corporations that have chosen to specialize in the Medicaid market. 
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cial MCOs, which has decreased from 202 private plans in 2007 to 157 in 2011. In con-
trast, the number of Medicaid-only MCOs increased in the same period from 143 to 
175 (CMS, 2011; Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2010). 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the share of Medicaid managed care (columns, left axis) 
and the overall Medicaid enrollment (dotted line, right axis) from 2000 to 2011. Medi-
caid enrollment has substantially increased over time. Managed care has become 
Medicaid’s dominant delivery system, covering 74 percent of all Medicaid enrollees, 
and serving over 42 million beneficiaries in 2011. The notable growth between 2000 
and 2002 reflects, on the one hand, state coverage expansions that occurred in the 
late 1990s. On the other hand, it is also related to the economic slowdown, as more 
people experienced job losses and income declines and became eligible for Medicaid 
(Holahan and Ghosh, 2005). A comparable trend can be seen after 2008, where the 
largest net increase in enrollment (of almost 4 million) reflects major expansions of 
Medicaid managed care in several states and the aftermath of the financial crisis. Be-
tween 2007 and 2008, the percentage of Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care rose 
from 64 percent to 71 percent. The managed care penetration rate varies significantly 
from state to state where highly urbanized states tend to have a higher percentage of 
beneficiaries enrolled in comprehensive risk-based plans (CMS, 2011; Kaiser Commis-
sion on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2010). 
  
83 
Figure 4.1:  Share of Medicaid Managed Care and Overall Medicaid Enrollment, 2000-2011 
 
 
4.3 Literature Review and Predictions 
Over the last decade, premiums in private health insurance have been growing at a 
much higher rate than earnings and overall inflation. Average premiums in employer-
sponsored health insurance have increased 69 percent since 2004 and have more than 
doubled since 2002 (Kaiser, 2014). Technological progress is widely considered to be 
responsible for driving up premiums (Newhouse, 1992; Cutler, 1995; Chernew et al., 
1998), but there are other factors that influence premiums.  
Changing market conditions in private health insurance induced changes in the 
provision, utilization, and financing of health care which also further attribute to pre-
mium increases. The widespread implementation of managed care in the 1990s was 
followed by the control of medical utilization, tighter provider networks, and cost-
saving measures (Mayes and Hurley, 2006; Rice, 1999). Implemented in an attempt of 
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private plans to maintain profitability, these restrictions became increasingly unpopu-
lar, and a managed care backlash ensued. Managed care reforms alleviated these re-
strictions but also ended the era of low premium increases in private health insurance 
(Frakt, 2011). 
Additional drivers of increasing premiums relate to the market structure and 
market concentration in private health insurance as well as health insurance reforms. 
Robinson (2004) analyzes the state-level market structure of commercial insurance 
carriers in 2000-2003. He finds that local health insurance markets in the U.S. are high-
ly concentrated and typically dominated by only three insurance carriers. Between 
2000 and 2003, health plans were able to raise prices consistently above the rate of 
growth in costs, with premium yields 1.5 to 2.0 percentage points above cost trends. 
Dafny et al. (2012) report similar results when estimating the impact of changes in 
local market concentration on premium growth over the period 1998-2006. They find 
that local markets are very concentrated and that consolidation during the observation 
period raised premiums by around 7 percent. Cogan et al. (2010) analyze the effect of 
Massachusetts’ health reform on employer-sponsored insurance premiums. They find 
that between 2004 and 2008 premiums in single coverage, employer-sponsored insur-
ance increased by about 6 percent due to the health reform. 
Consolidation, premium growth, and the economic downturn did not only af-
fect the private health insurance market but also swamped public programs, in particu-
lar the Medicaid program, because enrollment and spending increased. As a response, 
states made policy changes that affected benefits and provider reimbursement rates, 
and in the end they controlled the rate of Medicaid spending growth (Holahan and 
Ghosh, 2005). 
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Existing literature primarily focuses on evaluating the size and operation of the 
Medicaid program, i.e. access to care, cost of care and health outcomes within the 
Medicaid program.34 However, reforms and changes to public programs have affected 
private health insurance in various ways and reveal a mutual relationship of the private 
health insurance market with the Medicaid program. Expansions in eligibility which 
were intended to cover the uninsured had the effect of prompting individuals already 
enrolled in private insurance to switch into Medicaid. This effect, referred to as 
“crowding out”, has been recognized and measured in a variety of settings (e.g., Cutler 
and Gruber, 1996; Blumberg et al., 2000; Shore-Sheppard, 2000; Shore-Sheppard et al., 
2000; Lo Sasso and Buchmueller, 2004; Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2005; Gruber and 
Kosali, 2008; Shore-Sheppard, 2008).  
The interdependence of the public and private health insurance market further 
becomes obvious in terms of the reimbursement of providers. While insurers have to 
negotiate payments on an individual basis, public programs determine payment rates 
for providers. Hadley and Holahan (2003) analyze comparable populations of Medicaid 
and privately insured and identify lower provider payment rates in Medicaid as the 
underlying cause of lower health care costs. Furthermore, data collected by the Ameri-
can Hospital Association (AHA) displays huge variation in the payment-to-cost ratio in 
the hospital market depending on the type of insurance coverage, indicating a cost 
shift from privately to publicly insured and the uninsured. Dobson et al. (2006) define a 
cost shift as “the allocation of unpaid costs of care delivered to one patient population 
through above-cost payments collected from other patient populations”. In the period 
between 1992 and 2012 the payment-to-cost ratio for private payers ranged between 
                                                                
34
  Buchmueller et al. (2015) provide an overview on the Medicaid program and its impact on a 
broad range of outcomes. 
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1.15 and 1.48.35 For Medicare (Medicaid) the range was between .89 and 1.04 (.86 and 
.96) (AHA, 2014) indicating that with regard to remuneration, Medicare is slightly more 
generous than Medicaid. Zuckerman et al. (2009) show that, as a consequence of 
spending caps imposed by the states, Medicaid reimbursement levels fell in inflation-
adjusted terms between 2003 and 2008. In 2008, Medicaid reimbursement levels were 
only 72 percent of those in Medicare.  
While the crowding out phenomenon and cost shifts towards private health in-
surance are well recognized, little research has considered how the design and extent 
of Medicaid affects the performance of the private insurance market. This might be 
traced back to the fact that crowding out is relatively small when compared to its 
overall positive effect i.e., the reduction of uninsured. Changes in eligibility have not 
been so great as to spark fears that the private market would suffer any significant loss 
in enrollees. However, public health programs, like Medicaid or Medicare, may signifi-
cantly affect private health insurance markets on other dimensions, such as availability 
of services and the cost of coverage.  
In our study, we focus on premiums in comprehensive medical insurance in the 
private health insurance market and analyze how these are affected by the Medicaid 
program. We propose our first prediction as follows: 
Prediction 1:  Premiums in comprehensive medical insurance market increase with 
the size of the state’s Medicaid population.  
 
  
                                                                
35
  A payment-to-cost ratio of 1.15 indicates that for every dollar of cost, hospitals received 
$1.15 from private payers. 
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In the empirical analysis, we account for the extent of the Medicaid program 
by using the percentage of Medicaid enrollees in a given state for a given year. To con-
trol for cross-state variation with regard to the extent of the Medicaid program, we 
include the Medicaid costs per beneficiary in our regression. As states have considera-
ble leeway to set reimbursement levels to health care providers and to set eligibility 
rules, there are large differences across states in per-capita Medicaid expenditures. 
Expenditures per Medicaid beneficiary in fiscal year 2007 were $8450 in New York and 
$3168 in California, compared with an overall average of $5163 (Gilmer and Kronick, 
2011). Determinants of this great variation in Medicaid spending include differences in 
prices and amounts of services used as well as the underlying characteristics of popula-
tions, such as the percentages elderly and disabled (e.g., Fisher et al., 2003; Holahan, 
2007). In principal, we expect higher Medicaid costs per beneficiary to induce higher 
premiums in private health insurance due to the lack of adequate provider reim-
bursement rates and as a result of policy changes made by the states to control the 
rate of spending growth. 
An interesting feature of the Medicaid program is that it differs significantly 
from state to state. When analyzing its influence on the private health insurance mar-
ket in the U.S., it is important to take into account how Medicaid is organized in a state 
and to what extent private insurers participate in the program.  Three relationships are 
possible:  
(1) A state-run Medicaid program: State Medicaid agencies directly pay 
health care providers or contract with non-commercial Medicaid-only 
MCOs. The private insurer does not participate, nor do any other private 
insurers participate in Medicaid.  
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Figure 4.2 displays a state-run Medicaid environment in which the state Medi-
caid agency contracts with a Medicaid-only MCO. 
 
Figure 4.2: State-run Medicaid Environment 
 
States make use of Medicaid-only managed care arrangements and existing 
provider networks to control costs. McCue (2012) analyzes the financial performance 
of health plans in Medicaid managed care and finds that Medicaid-only MCOs incur a 
lower medical loss ratio and higher administrative cost ratio than commercial plans 
due to more cost-effective care. A state-run system might further be more cost-
effective in a sense that providers and private insurance companies have fewer oppor-
tunities to engage in cost shifting towards the Medicaid program. However, cost shifts 
might arise from providers towards privately insured as a result of low and fully capi-
tated Medicaid provider reimbursements. Thus, we expect Medicaid costs per benefi-
ciary to be lower in Medicaid systems that are operated by the state. In contrast, pre-
miums in private health insurance are higher in state-run systems and increase with 
the size of the Medicaid program and proportion of Medicaid managed care as a result 
of providers’ cost-shifting activities. 
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(2)  A non-state-run Medicaid environment with the participation of the  
private insurer: The private insurer operates in a state with a non-state-
run Medicaid program. In this case, state Medicaid agencies contract with 
commercial Medicaid MCOs, and the private insurer participates in the 
program (i.e., covers Medicaid enrollees on a risk basis).  
(3)  A non-state-run Medicaid environment without the participation of the 
private insurer: The private insurer operates in a state with a non-state-
run Medicaid program, but does not participate. 
 
Figure 4.3 displays a non-state-run Medicaid system. Private insurers that par-
ticipate in the public program then operate Medicaid besides comprehensive medical 
insurance and other lines of business. However, there are still private health insurers in 
the market that do not participate in Medicaid. 
 
Figure 4.3: Non-state-run Medicaid Environment 
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Long and Yemane (2005) analyze factors that explain commercial plans’ deci-
sions to stay in or exit from Medicaid managed care. They find that higher capitation 
rates and higher growth rates in capitation rates are associated with a lower probabil-
ity that commercial plans exit. Furthermore, private health insurers that have invested 
in Medicaid managed care and cover a larger share of the market are more likely to 
stay. Holahan and Suzuki (2003) surveyed Medicaid managed care payment methods 
in 2001 and find considerable variation across states. The authors attribute the level of 
payment rates and the degree to which states adjust for risk to be crucial for commer-
cial plans’ willingness to serve the Medicaid clientele. Our research takes the participa-
tion in Medicaid as a given, but we recognize the selection that occurs when private 
insurers have different incentives and strategies that drive the decision to participate.  
 In a non-state-run environment, cost shifts can possibly lead into various direc-
tions. Private health insurers that do not participate in Medicaid could experience cost 
shifts from providers that serve the Medicaid population. Provider-induced cost shifts 
might also affect participating health insurers, but these insurers have the potential to 
alleviate additional costs within their Medicaid business. Hence, we expect that insur-
ers are directly affected by their participation in the Medicaid program. Participating 
insurers are likely to be less prone to Medicaid related premium increases, as they can 
internalize cost shifts through their commercial Medicaid MCOs. We expect that the 
extent to which insurers are affected and cost-shifting results, increases as the popula-
tion enrolled in the program increases. We therefore evaluate the following predic-
tion: 
Prediction 2:  Premiums in comprehensive medical insurance business increase if a 
greater share of the state’s Medicaid population is enrolled in Medicaid 
managed care. 
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In the analysis, we further include state demographic factors (e.g., per capita 
income, the percentage of uninsured and individuals over 65 years) and variables that 
account for differences in the states’ health care markets. Higher income levels and 
wages influence cost and payment levels in the health care market. Thus, a higher per 
capita income is typically related to higher health care costs and insurance premiums. 
The same impact can be expected from a higher portion of individuals over 65 years, as 
they are more likely to cause higher health care utilization and higher costs. Despite 
state and government funded health insurance programs to cover this population (e.g., 
Medicaid and Medicare), providers might offset prices through cost shifts towards 
private health insurance due to lower provider payment rates in public programs. 
Thus, we expect premiums in private health insurance will increase with the number of 
individuals over 65 years. The same effect should appear in the matter of uncompen-
sated care of the uninsured. Over the last decade, there has been an upward trend in 
the emergency utilization rate of the uninsured.  Qin and Liu (2013) calculate that un-
compensated hospital emergency utilization increased from 30.2 percent to 43.8 per-
cent between 2000 and 2007. In 2013, the cost for uncompensated care provided to 
uninsured individuals was $84.9 billion (Coughlin et al., 2014). A large portion of this 
amount was paid by the federal government through a variety of programs (including 
Medicaid and Medicare), states, and the private sector. Stoll (2005) estimates the im-
pact of uncompensated care funded through cost shifts to amount an extra $922 for 
family health insurance and $341 for individual insurance, on average. Hadley et al. 
(2008) estimate this impact to be smaller, as they include further government sources 
and the assumption that some providers absorb the cost of uncompensated care in the 
form of lower profits. Thus, we expect premiums in private health insurance will in-
crease with the state’s share of uninsured. 
  
92 
It is useful to control for characteristics of the states’ health care markets with 
respect to the provision and costs of care as they vary significantly across states and 
influence the health care market itself as well as premiums in private health insurance. 
The consolidation of the hospital sector has permitted hospital systems to raise the 
rates charged to insurers and thus led to higher prices (Bates and Santerre, 2008; Cuel-
lar and Gertler, 2003; Robinson, 2004). In our analysis, we account for the number of 
hospitals (per thousand state inhabitants) and expect that a higher concentrated hos-
pital market increases premiums in private health insurance. We expect the same im-
pact for the state average physician salary per year.  
As noted above, the level of market concentration in private health insurance 
influences premium growth (Dafny et al., 2012). We measure the competitiveness of 
private insurers’ comprehensive business on the state-level using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) and expect higher premiums to be accompanied by higher val-
ues of HHI.   
Over the last decade, the erosion in employment-based coverage, enrollment 
losses, and the profitability downturn in the managed care industry have altered pri-
vate insurers’ interest in public-sector lines of business (e.g., Medicaid and Medicare). 
In principle, diversification across different products and markets has been private 
health insurers’ core strategy to remain profitable (Robinson, 2006). In our analysis, we 
include the numbers of lines and states in which the insurer operates to account for 
the degree of diversification, but its impact on premiums is twofold. Diversification can 
be a means to spread risk and offset losses but this potential relies on each line’s (or 
state’s) profitability and whether economies of scope apply (i.e., using existing provid-
er networks).  
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Another main determinant of an insurer’s profitability is market share. A high-
er market share is associated with more efficient methods of operation (economies of 
scale) that could be captured in claims processing and negotiating provider networks 
though greater market power (Austin and Hungerford, 2009). We therefore expect 
that a higher market share in comprehensive business is associated with lower premi-
ums.  
Finally, in order to control for the health plan’s financial performance we in-
clude a measure of the insurer’s potential to bear risk, i.e. its financial capacity. The 
insurer’s financial capacity is represented by its premium volume divided by total sur-
plus and thus proxies the amount of risk it can underwrite based on its financial condi-
tion.  
 
4.4 Data and Methodology 
The data for our analysis was obtained from the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners’ (NAIC) Health Insurers Annual Statutory Data. We include data for all 
insurers that reported financial information to the NAIC from the years 2001-2009. We 
limit our observation period to 2009, as with the passage of the PPACA in 2010 a broad 
range of provisions (e.g. expansion of Medicaid, creation of an insurance exchange) 
will come into place, affecting both, the Medicaid program and private health insur-
ance in subsequent years. The NAIC data set contains detailed information, by state 
and by line of business, on premiums earned, administrative expenses, surpluses, and 
enrollees. State level market concentration measures were calculated from this data36 
and all monetary values have been adjusted for inflation ($2009). The analysis includes 
data from 30 states of which 15 states have a state-run Medicaid system and 15 states 
                                                                
36
  We do not include self-insured employers or health business reported by life insurers. 
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admit commercial private health insurers to the provision of Medicaid services (non-
state-run).37 For the insurer-level analysis, we include multi-state operating companies 
that write premiums in comprehensive medical business and truncate the sample at 
the 99 percent quantile. Further, we only consider health insurance companies that 
have total premiums earned of at least $5,000 and covered at least 1,000 enrollees per 
year.  
Overall, in the period of 2001-2009 we have a total of 2,733 observations.38 
We divide the dataset into three different subsamples: The first subset includes obser-
vations for all insurers in states where Medicaid is solely operated by the states’ Medi-
caid agencies in absence of any commercial health insurer participation (n=752). The 
remaining 1,981 observations represent private insurers in a competitive non-state-
run Medicaid environment.39 About 33 percent of these health insurers participate in 
Medicaid managed care (NSR-PAR) and constitute our second subsample with 659 
observations. The third subsample contains 1,322 observations of companies that have 
no premium income in Medicaid and thus do not participate (NSR-NPAR). Figure 4.4 
gives an overview of the number of health insurers in comprehensive medical insur-
ance considering the states’ Medicaid environment and the insurers’ participation in 
Medicaid. 
                                                                
37
  We exclude 20 states from our analysis because either (1) insurers in the state did not pro-
vide a financial report to the NAIC for some years in our sample, or (2) the state switched 
between a state-run Medicaid program and Medicaid managed care program which in-
volved commercial health insurers (non-state-run). A detailed overview on states that have 
been dropped from the sample can be found in Appendix D. 
38
   Sample statistics for the overall sample are provided in Appendix A. 
39
  The classification of state-run and non-state-run is based on data from the NAIC and recon-
ciled with Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS) data obtained from CMS. A state 
has a non-state-run Medicaid system in case a company reports positive premiums earned 
in Medicaid (according to NAIC data) and Medicaid enrollees in commercial HMOs were re-
ported to CMS in that state. 
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Figure 4.4: Number of Comprehensive Medical Insurers, 2001-2009 
 
 
We combine insurer-level data with several state demographics that were ob-
tained from U.S. Census, i.e. state average income per capita, the percentage of the 
population over 65 years, and data on health insurance coverage status, i.e. states’ 
Medicaid enrollment and the percent of the population that is uninsured. State-level 
calculations of Medicaid costs per beneficiary and the proportion of Medicaid benefi-
ciaries covered in Medicaid managed care organizations are derived from data from 
the Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS) provided by the CMS. As we further 
want to control for a state’s medical provider infrastructure, we include data on the 
number of hospitals per thousand inhabitants, obtained from the American Hospital 
Association Annual Survey of Hospitals, and the state average annual physician salary 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics Survey. Table 
4.1 provides an overview and a description of the variables used in the analysis. 
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Table 4.1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variable  
Premiums in Compre-
hensive Business  
Premiums earned per member for insurers i in year t in 
comprehensive business (in $2009). 
Independent Variables  
Percentage Medicaid The percentage Medicaid enrollees in state j during  
year t. 
Medicaid Costs  The Medicaid costs per beneficiary in state j during year t 
(in hundreds $2009). 
Medicaid Managed 
Care 
Share of Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in Managed Care 
Organizations in state j during year t. 
Percentage Uninsured The percentage of uninsured in state j during year t. 
Average Income  The average income per capita in state j during year t  
(in thousands $2009). 
Population over 65  The percentage of individuals over 65 years in state j over 
year t. 
Hospitals  The number of hospitals per thousand inhabitants in 
state j during year t. 
Physician Salary The average physician salary in state j during year t (in 
thousands $2009). 
HHI Herfindahl- Hirschman Index of state j calculated as the 
sum of the squares of insurer i's market share in compre-
hensive business (measured as premiums earned) in state 
j during year t. 
Number of Lines The number of lines in which insurer i has business during 
year t. 
Number of states The number of states in which insurer i operates during  
year t. 
Capacity Insurer i's total premiums written divided by insurer i's 
surplus during year t. 
Market Share Insurer i's market share in comprehensive business 
(measured as premiums earned) in the state j during  
year t. 
 
Using different subsets, we estimate a multivariate regression model with an-
nual premiums earned per member as the dependent variable. We incorporate state-
fixed effects to account for unobservable demand and cost conditions that are time-
invariant across markets. Further, we incorporate year-fixed effects to capture factors 
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that vary over time that are common to all states. We cluster standard errors at the 
state level in order to account for the fact that companies in a state face the same 
regulatory and Medicaid environment. 
Formally, we estimate the following model: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡  + 𝛽3𝑀𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡  + 
       + 𝛽𝑛
′ 𝜗𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽𝑛
′ 𝜇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝑗 +𝛿𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡           (1) 
where, 
𝜗𝑗𝑡 = a vector of state-level characteristics that influence premiums in  
     state j during year t 
𝜇𝑖𝑡  = a vector of company characteristics to control for heterogeneity of    
     insurer i in year t 
𝛾𝑗  captures state-fixed effects, 𝛿𝑡  captures year-fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a  
random error term.  
The exogenous regressors contain a set of variables, which we split into differ-
ent groups. The influence of Medicaid related variables on premiums in comprehen-
sive medical insurance are the main focus of our analysis. These include state-level 
measures on the percentage of Medicaid insured, Medicaid costs per beneficiary, and 
the proportion of managed care in the state’s Medicaid market. As noted above, we 
further include state-level measures of the health care provider market such as the 
number of hospitals per thousand inhabitants, the average annual salary of physician, 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in comprehensive medical business, the percentage of 
uninsured, state average (per capita) income, and the proportion of the population 
above 65 years. Furthermore, we use company-specific characteristics to account for 
insurer heterogeneity. These include the number of lines and states in which the com-
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pany operates, the insurer’s market share in comprehensive medical insurance, and 
capacity. 
4.5 Results 
Before reporting the results from the empirical model, we have a closer look at how 
annual premiums developed in the observation period. Between 2001 and 2009, pre-
miums in the overall sample increased on average by 49 percent, from an average an-
nual premium of $2,263 in 2001 to $3,374 in 2009.40 Technological progress, changing 
market conditions, and market consolidations in private health insurance are the driv-
ing factors for the premium increases. Figure 4.5 presents the 25th, 50th, and 75th per-
centile of premium development and the overall average premium in the observation 
period for our sample of insurers.  
 
Figure 4.5: Annual Premiums per Enrollee in Comprehensive Medical Insurance, 2001-2009 
 
Notes: Dashed black line displays the average annual premium over the sample period. 
Source: NAIC Annual Data for Health Insurers.  
                                                                
40
  Dafny et al. (2012) find similar premium increases in their sample. 
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Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics for the two subsamples. In states 
without any private insurers’ participation in the Medicaid program, premiums in 
comprehensive medical insurance are significantly higher ($3,061) than in states with a 
non-state-run Medicaid environment ($2,953). Furthermore, these states have lower 
Medicaid costs per beneficiary ($5,145) and report a higher percentage of Medicaid 
enrollees (13 percent) and uninsured (15 percent). These numbers provide some evi-
dence that state-run Medicaid states may operate their program more cost-effectively, 
but simultaneously induce higher cost-shifts towards comprehensive premiums in pri-
vate health insurance.  
The proportion of Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in Medicaid managed care, 
in form of Medicaid-only MCOs (in a state-run) or Medicaid-only and commercial Med-
icaid MCOs (in a non-state-run environment), does not significantly differ. In states 
with private health insurers’ participation in the Medicaid program, the average in-
come ($40,715) and relative size of the population over 65 (13 percent) is significantly 
higher.  
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics by Medicaid Environment, 2001-2009 
 
STATE-RUN 
(N=752) 
NON-STATE-RUN 
(N=1,981)   
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean-Diff. 
Dependent Variable       
Premiums in  
Comprehensive 
3,061.983 (805.921) 2,953.531 (1,026.340) -108.452 *** 
Independent Variables       
Percentage Medicaid 13.191 (3.551) 12.399 (3.505) -0.792 *** 
Medicaid Costs (in $100) 51.452 (13.272) 59.364 (16.340) 7.912 *** 
Medicaid Managed Care 71.210 (24.384) 71.485 (15.371) 0.275 
 
Percentage Uninsured 15.060 (2.984) 14.193 (5.194) -0.866 *** 
Average Income  
(in $1,000) 
36.383 (5.540) 40.715 (4.737) 4.331 *** 
Population over 65 12.192 (1.631) 13.012 (2.030) 0.819 *** 
Hospitals 25.943 (13.698) 15.299 (5.405) -10.644 *** 
Physician Salary 165.863 (21.612) 165.490 (21.444) -0.373 
 
HHI 3,900.483 (2,173.920) 2,004.482 (1,198.057) -1,896.00 *** 
Number of Lines 2.805 (1.648) 2.951 (1.568) 0.147 ** 
Number of States 1.965 (2.259) 1.543 (1.686) -0.422 *** 
Market Share  17.394 (24.440) 6.744 (11.868) -52.652 *** 
Capacity 7.456 (6.473) 8.449 (27.346) 0.993 
 
 
 
Health care markets also differ significantly. States with state-run Medicaid 
systems have a substantially higher number of hospitals per thousand inhabitants 
(25.943), but there is no significant difference in the average physician salary. Private 
health insurers operating in a state-run Medicaid system face a significantly less com-
petitive market environment in comprehensive medical business (HHI of 3,900) and 
have on average higher market shares (17 percent) compared to insurers in non-state-
run Medicaid systems.  
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics in NSR by Insurer’s Participation, 2001-2009 
  
NSR-PARTICIPATION    
(N=659) 
NSR-NO PARTICIPATION   
(N=1,322)  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean-Diff. 
Dependent Variable       
Premiums in  
Comprehensive  
2,963.022 (901.315) 2,948.800 (1,083.582) -14.223 
 
Independent Variables       
Percentage Medicaid 12.618 (3.381) 12.290 (3.562) -0.329 ** 
Medicaid Costs (in $100) 57.444 (16.414) 60.321 (16.225) 2.877 *** 
Medicaid Managed Care    69.683 (15.509) 72.383 (15.227) 2.700 *** 
Percentage Uninsured 14.643 (5.382) 13.969 (5.085) -0.674 *** 
Average Income  
(in $1,000) 
39.912 (4.398) 41.115 (4.849) 1.202 *** 
Population over 65  13.084 (2.141) 12.975 (1.973) -0.108 
 
Hospitals  15.720 (5.566) 15.089 (5.312) -0.632 ** 
Physician Salary 164.859 (23.745) 165.805 (20.201) 0.946 
 
HHI 2,026.310 (1,360.756) 1,993.601 (1,108.468) -32.709 
 
Number of Lines 3.566 (1.423) 2.644 (1.547) -0.922 *** 
Number of States 1.039 (0.195) 1.794 (2.013) 0.755 *** 
Market Share  8.369 (13.326) 5.934 (10.986) -2.436 *** 
Capacity 10.429 (11.513) 7.463 (32.433) -2.966 ** 
 
 
Table 4.3 presents the summary statistics for insurers that operate in a non-
state-run Medicaid environment with the distinction between participation and non-
participation in the Medicaid program. Therefore, our main focus is on company-
specific characteristics. We find that insurers that are active in Medicaid operate in 
significantly more lines of business (3.566) and have a larger market share in compre-
hensive medical business (8.4 percent) but operate in fewer states (1.039) than non-
participating companies. With regard to financial situation, commercial insurers with 
premium income from Medicaid business have greater leverage (capacity) to bear risk 
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(10.429). These figures indicate that predominantly big companies with a large market 
share in comprehensive business and a stable financial situation engage in Medicaid 
business.   
For the empirical model, we run a fixed effects regression on annual premiums 
earned in the overall comprehensive medical business for the three subsamples. Com-
panies in the unbalanced panel are observed for an average period of 5.6 (SR), 5.6 
(NSR-PAR), and 5.2 (NSR-NPAR) years, respectively. As shown in Table 4.4, we find that 
the impact of most Medicaid program related variables is positive and significant: A 
higher percentage of Medicaid enrollees in a state is associated with higher premiums 
in private health insurance. This result is in line with Prediction 1. In terms of economic 
significance, if evaluated at the mean, a 1 percent increase in the state’s percentage of 
Medicaid beneficiaries raises annual comprehensive premiums by $30.78 in a state-run 
Medicaid environment and $100.16 in a non-state-run Medicaid environment in ab-
sence of the insurers’ participation in Medicaid. These results provide support for Pre-
diction 1 that premiums in private health insurance are significantly affected by the 
size of the state’s Medicaid population as a result of cost-shifting activities. 
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Table 4.4: Insurer-level Fixed Effects Regression on Annual Premiums per Enrollee, 2001-2009 
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
  STATE-RUN (SR) NON-STATE-RUN (NSR) 
      PARTICIPATION (PAR) NO PARTICIPATION (NPAR) 
Percentage Medicaid 30.783* (16.145) 95.096*** (26.374) 100.159*** (21.502) 
Medicaid Costs  3.827 (2.444) 4.873 (9.430) 9.707 (7.587) 
Medicaid Managed Care 4.001** (1.658) -4.891 (3.742) 5.314* (2.683) 
Percentage Uninsured 11.763 (13.325) 16.113 (18.463) 56.267** (19.874) 
Population over 65  461.670*** (84.226) 209.553* (106.057) 100.589* (49.324) 
Average Income 46.297*** (13.009) 88.029** (37.432) 103.618*** (21.609) 
Hospitals  -34.284** (12.644) -93.946 (73.367) -61.715 (38.513) 
Physician Salary 1.817* (0.893) -0.257 (3.704) 2.321 (1.600) 
HHI 0.001 (0.025) -0.052 (0.078) 0.010 (0.057) 
Market Share -5.721** (1.931) -24.913*** (7.649) -2.438 (11.504) 
Number of Lines -20.602 (19.870) -12.422 (96.834) 34.495 (47.106) 
Number of States 14.817 (23.941) -247.962 (159.747) -60.046* (29.036) 
Capacity -2.119 (4.297) 3.144 (2.326) -0.444** (0.196) 
Constant -4,589.632*** (980.385) -2,564.129 (2,354.326) -5,042.761*** (1,236.325) 
N 752 
 
659 
 
1,322 
 
R² 0.544 
 
0.388 
 
0.403 
 
1
0
3
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The coefficient for Medicaid costs per beneficiary is not significant in any sub-
sample, whereas the positive and significant effect of the implementation of Medicaid 
managed care becomes clear at a second glance: Although the coefficients are small in 
size, a 1 percent increase of the state’s Medicaid population enrolled in Medicaid 
MCOs raises premiums in comprehensive business by $4.00 (SR) or $5.31 (NSR-NPAR) 
respectively. Managed care is usually associated with the potential to contain costs 
through the integration of the financing and delivery of health services. However, for 
commercial insurers, it bears the risk of cross-subsidization towards Medicaid as a 
result of low provider reimbursement and fully capitated Medicaid MCOs. In our anal-
ysis, this effect only becomes obvious for insurers that do not write business in Medi-
caid, either because of state regulation (SR) or company decisions (NSR-NPAR). Insur-
ers offering commercial Medicaid MCOs (NSR-PAR) seem to be able to internalize 
these cost-shifts although the coefficient is not significant. These results provide sup-
port for Prediction 2 that premiums in private health insurance increase with the 
share of Medicaid managed care in a state. 
Coefficients of several control variables are also significant and straightfor-
ward. We find that higher per capita income is associated with higher premiums in 
comprehensive medical business. If evaluated at the mean, raising average income by 
$1,000 lead to a premium increases of $46.30 (SR) and in a non-state-run environment 
$88.03 (PAR) or $103.62 (NPAR). Here, a higher willingness to pay and/or higher cov-
erage might trigger the result. The effect of a higher percentage of individuals over 65 
years is also significantly positive in all three subsamples, indicating that this popula-
tion group with, on average, higher medical expenses might be cross-financed by pri-
vate health insurance (although insured in public health programs as Medi-
care). It constitutes the largest effect in our analysis, indicating that a 1 percent in-
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crease in the state’s share of individuals over 65 increases premiums in private health 
insurance by $100.59 (NSR-NPAR) up to $461.67 (SR) depending on the state’s Medi-
caid environment. Likewise, the impact of the state’s uninsured percentage is similar: 
Here, increasing the uninsured population by 1 percent leads to premium increases of 
$56.27 in comprehensive medical business when the insurer does not write Medicaid 
business (NSR-NPAR). 
State-level measures of the provider market show that a more competitive 
hospital sector is associated with lower premiums in comprehensive medical insur-
ance. We find that one additional hospital per 1,000 state inhabitants reduces premi-
ums in comprehensive medical insurance by $34.28 (SR). The impact of the annual 
physicians’ salary on premiums in private health insurance is only significant in state-
run Medicaid markets but negligible in economic terms. 
With respect to insurer heterogeneity and the financial performance of pri-
vate health insurers, the results show that insurers that increase their market share in 
comprehensive medical business have the potential to offer coverage at a lower pre-
mium, and thus pass on economies of scale towards the insured. If evaluated at the 
mean, an increase of a company’s market share by 1 percent is associated with annual 
premium reductions of $5.72 (SR) and $24.91 (NSR-PAR). A positive effect of diversifi-
cation into different lines of business on premiums does not become evident in our 
samples. However, multi-state operations are associated with lower premiums in 
comprehensive medical insurance: an insurer that operates in a non-state-run Medi-
caid state but is not active in Medicaid, writes $60.05 lower premiums when it extends 
its business to an additional state. The companies’ financial performance is affected as 
expected: a better ability to bear risk (i.e. higher capacity) results in premium reduc-
tions in comprehensive medical insurance. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
In this study, we examine how the design and extent of the federal-state Medicaid 
program affects premiums in private health insurance between 2001 and 2009. Over 
the last decades, Medicaid has transitioned into a managed care based program. De-
pending on the states’ regulatory Medicaid environment, state Medicaid agencies can 
subcontract with (1) provider networks to enroll beneficiaries in Medicaid-only man-
aged care organizations or (2) with private health insurers to enroll parts of the state’s 
Medicaid population in commercial managed care plans. As those individuals covered 
by public health care programs and those with private health insurance demand pro-
vide health services from the same providers, both markets are interrelated. We do 
not examine the private insurers’ decision to enter the Medicaid market but rather 
focus on the influence of Medicaid on private health insurance accounting for the size 
of the public program and the regulatory environment.  
With respect to market characteristics, we find that insurers that operate in 
state-run Medicaid environments face less competitive health insurance markets and 
charge higher premiums in private comprehensive business. Whereas, in states that 
open Medicaid to private health insurers, predominantly larger insurers that operate 
in more lines of business and have on average higher market shares participate in 
Medicaid. 
In our multivariate analysis, we find evidence that premiums in private health 
insurance are positively related to the size of the state’s Medicaid and uninsured pop-
ulation. Furthermore, a higher utilization of Medicaid MCOs increases premiums in 
private health insurance if insurers do not participate in the Medicaid program inde-
pendent of the regulatory environment. These findings support our hypothesis that 
cost shifting from Medicaid enrollees and the uninsured towards private health insur-
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ance is a consequence of low provider reimbursement, fully capitated Medicaid man-
aged care plans, and uncompensated care.    
As the U.S. health insurance market transforms in the aftermath of the PPACA, 
we are likely to see significant changes both in public health care and private health 
insurance market. As the government may play a larger role over time in providing 
insurance to certain populations, private insurers may have an increasingly difficult 
time in remaining profitable and premiums in the private market may rise.41 Our re-
sults provide an initial indication of how private insurers may be affected by the gov-
ernment’s involvement in providing health insurance coverage; our plan for future 
research will explore this relationship further.  
 
 
  
                                                                
41
  PPACA’s effect on premiums is theoretically indeterminate. On the one hand, the reform 
might lead to lower premiums for employer-sponsored insurance. The creation of an insur-
ance exchange could reduce transaction costs, especially for small employers. In addition, 
the individual and employer mandates, by expanding coverage, could reduce cost shifting 
from the uninsured. On the other hand, the reform might lead to higher premiums. If the 
supply of health services is upward-sloping, then the expansion in the demand for health 
services induced by the plan would lead prices of health services to increase, and premiums 
to follow prices. Any expansion of regulation through the exchange could exacerbate this 
effect.  
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5 General Conclusions 
This thesis discusses and analyzes individual aspects of recent health reforms in both 
Germany and the U.S. Although, the two health care systems differ in its origin and 
alignment, the comparative consideration contributes to improve the understanding 
of economic problems of health insurance. The thesis shows that despite the wide 
differences, many aspects are relevant to both systems such as SuppHI and CDHC.  
In this thesis, chapter 1 outlines the particularities and imperfections of the 
health care market, which mostly arise because of incomplete and asymmetric infor-
mation. Furthermore, it gives an overview on the two health insurance systems of 
Germany and the U.S. and highlights recent reform proposals in economic context. 
Two trends can be observed: German SHI pursued an intensified market-based orien-
tation characterized by benefit cuts and the implementation of economic incentives 
over the last two decades. Meanwhile, the U.S. focused on the most important social 
aspect of health insurance: Since 2010, affordable and universal health insurance cov-
erage is available for the first time in history. 
 In Germany, a number of cost-control policies that restricted SHI coverage 
have resulted in increased out-of-pocket expenses and therefore contributed to the 
rising demand for SuppHI. To this end, chapter 2 empirically assesses the determi-
nants of demand and selection effects in SuppHI in Germany. Unlike previous studies, 
the individuals’ actual health state has been assessed by doctor-diagnosed diseases in 
this analysis as opposed to self-reported health states or doctor visits. The estimates 
from the GSOEP analyses suggest that income and insurance affinity, measured by 
switching behavior in SHI and the demand for life insurance, positively affect the de-
mand for both supplemental hospital and dental benefits. While the effect of income 
is straightforward, the concept of insurance affinity is based on the idea that individu-
als have acquainted themselves with the concept of insurance and a switch of their 
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SHI provider indicates a conscious insurance decision in consideration of financial and 
quality aspects. More importantly, with regard to the individuals’ health state the 
estimates indicate potential selection effects related adverse selection. In the sample 
of non-senior individuals (age 65 and younger), the estimates show that holding hospi-
tal SuppHI is associated with a higher likelihood of becoming sick in the future. The 
reverse is true for individuals older than 65; individuals with supplemental hospital 
coverage are healthier on average.  
 Chapter 3 gives insights on CDHC as a new trend in health insurance. The 
combination of tax-favored savings accounts and catastrophic health insurance plans 
to (partially) finance health care costs are well known from the U.S., but can also be 
observed in several other countries (i.e., Singapore, China, and Hong Kong). Besides a 
broad overview on the concept of HSAs and experiences from the U.S., the chapter 
discusses suitable ways to implement HSAs to German SHI building on newly defined 
Flexible Health Plans. It proposes an approach, which requires very little changes to 
the current system, while taking into consideration the particularities of SHI as well as 
financial and fiscal aspects. HSAs can then increase cost transparency and induce the 
insured to consume health care in a conscious way, therefore contributing to reduce 
moral hazard.  Meanwhile, they would offer the insured new flexibility to design their 
health insurance options.    
In chapter 4, the focus shifts to the U.S. health insurance system. Most partic-
ularly, it reveals the close interdependence of PHI and public health insurance pro-
grams addressing cost-shifting issues related to uncompensated care. Using financial 
data from private health insurers provided by the NAIC, the chapter analyzes how the 
price for coverage in PHI relates to the design and extent of government provided 
health insurance. As Medicaid is administered at the state level, the program signifi-
cantly varies across states with regard to its size and private health insurers’ direct 
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participation; as for some states, Medicaid is outsourced and private insurers operate 
Medicaid MCOs as a line of business. The estimates from the multivariate analysis 
show that premiums in PHI are positively related to the size of the state’s Medicaid 
and uninsured population. Likewise, a higher utilization of Medicaid MCOs increases 
premiums in PHI. These findings indicate cost shifting from Medicaid enrollees and 
uninsured towards PHI as a consequence of low provider reimbursement, fully capi-
tated Medicaid managed care plans, and uncompensated care. 
To sum up, health insurance is a valuable commodity and designing equitable 
and affordable access meanwhile considering economic aspects are the main chal-
lenges for health policy makers in most industrial nations. Although health insurance 
systems have historically developed, social rethinking with regard to financing health 
care costs will be necessary to cope with current developments. Demographic change 
and technological progress will tie up more financial resources and constitute a heavy 
burden on the budgets of social security systems in the future. Therefore, it will be 
important to reduce inefficiencies and deteriorations inherent to the co-existence of 
public and private health insurance systems (i.e. spill over and selection effects). This 
thesis analyzes selected issues of recent health reforms and underlines that, despite 
the constant striving for cost-containment and efficiency, aspects of social justice have 
to be taken into consideration as well. 
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Appendix A 
Table A 1: Probit Regression on Hospital SuppHI - Self-Assessed Health Status 
  Pr(Hospital SuppHI) 
  Model XI 
Variables of Interest 
  
  
Household income (log) 0.0626 *** (0.0118) 
SAHS (very good) 0.0043 
 
(0.0121) 
SAHS (good) 0.0080 
 
(0.0087) 
SAHS (fair) 0.0067 
 
(0.0090) 
Life insurance 0.0317 *** (0.0056) 
Change of SHI provider 0.0272 ** (0.0122) 
Control Variables 
  
 
Male -0.0087 
 
(0.0058) 
Age: younger than 26 -0.0405 *** (0.0087) 
Age: 26-35 0.0005 
 
(0.0079) 
Age: 46-55 -0.0117 * (0.0069) 
Age 56-65 0.0020 
 
(0.0093) 
BMI -0.0009 
 
(0.0006) 
Household size -0.0182 *** (0.0027) 
Risk attitude -0.0048 
 
(0.0177) 
Risk attitude*income 0.0006 
 
(0.0022) 
Hospital stay in t-1 0.0069 
 
(0.0097) 
Low level of school -0.0215 *** (0.0065) 
High level of school 0.0273 *** (0.0076) 
Blue collar worker -0.0100 
 
(0.0072) 
Trainee 0.0144 
 
(0.0162) 
Unemployed -0.0072 
 
(0.0139) 
Retired -0.0012 
 
(0.0143) 
No job 0.0091 
 
(0.0125) 
SHI voluntary member 0.0106 
 
(0.0091) 
SHI family member -0.0109 
 
(0.0089) 
SHI other member -0.0080 
 
(0.0116) 
Observations 9,804   
Log Likelihood -2759.4800     
Notes: Standard deviations reported in parentheses. ***,**,* significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. Reference groups: self-assessed health status: Poor or very poor, Age: 36-45, Medium level of 
school, White-collar worker, SHI compulsory member. 
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Table A 2: Summary Statistics - Subsample of Compulsory Insured 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables 
   
Hospital benefits 6,216 0.10 (0.29) 
Dental benefits 6,216 0.16 (0.37) 
Variables of interest 
   Household income (log) 6,216 7.87 (0.49) 
Sick in 2009 6,216 0.30 (0.46) 
Life insurance 6,216 0.64 (0.48) 
Change of SHI provider 6,216 0.07 (0.25) 
Control Variables 
   Male 6,216 0.48 (0.50) 
Age 6,216 42.44 (11.46) 
Age: younger than 26 6,216 0.08 (0.28) 
Age: 26-35 6,216 0.21 (0.40) 
Age: 36-45 6,216 0.29 (0.45) 
Age: 46-55 6,216 0.27 (0.45) 
Age: 56-65 6,216 0.15 (0.35) 
BMI 6,216 25.96 (4.59) 
Household size 6,216 2.79 (1.22) 
Monthly net income 6,216 2,917.29 (1,397.39) 
Risk attitude 6,216 4.53 (2.22) 
Hospital stay in t-1 6,216 0.09 (0.28) 
Self-ass. health: Very good 6,216 0.09 (0.29) 
Self-ass. health: Good 6,216 0.47 (0.50) 
Self-ass. health: Fair 6,216 0.31 (0.46) 
Self-ass. health: Poor 6,216 0.13 (0.33) 
Low level of school 6,216 0.36 (0.48) 
Medium level of school 6,216 0.43 (0.49) 
High level of school 6,216 0.21 (0.41) 
Blue collar worker 6,216 0.33 (0.47) 
White collar worker 6,216 0.53 (0.50) 
Trainee 6,216 0.05 (0.21) 
Unemployed 6,216 0.04 (0.19) 
Retired 6,216 0.04 (0.18) 
No job 6,216 0.03 (0.16) 
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Appendix B 
 
The following example illustrates the possible savings within a tax treatment for low-, 
medium- and high-income non-married individuals (€20,000, €40,000 and €80,000 
gross income after all tax deductions). We assume in all the cases an HDHP with a 
deductible of €1,000, which induces a bonus payment of €700. The marginal tax rates 
follow the German tax tables and for the sake of simplicity we assume that the premi-
um payment does not change the marginal tax rate. We assume that the received 
bonus is invested risk-free at an interest rate of 4% and that individuals have to pay 
25% capital gains tax outside the HSA.  For the sake of simplicity, we omit the solidari-
ty surcharge. To be precise, solidarity tax contribution and also church taxes if appli-
cable are also reduced if the income tax burden decreases. For the sake of simplicity 
and as these extra taxes are much lower, we omit them in the following example. 
Table B 1: Example of the Tax Subsidies of an HSA in Different Income Brackets 
 €20,000  €40,000 €80,000 
Marginal tax rate 28.14% 37.34% 42.00% 
Deductible €1,000 €1,000 €1,000 
Contribution to an HSA €700 €700 €700 
Balance after a year in an HSA €728 €728 €728 
Bonus payment after tax €503.02 €438.62 €406.00 
Bonus payment after tax an interest of a year €518.11 €451.78 €418.18 
 
This example shows that the tax-favored investment of the bonus payment in an HSA 
leads to significant tax savings in all three cases. Yet, the high-income group has the 
highest savings potential. However, as the tax progression within the German taxation 
scheme starts much earlier than in the U.S., selection issues do not play as important a 
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role in Germany. Even though the absolute tax subsidy does increase with income, the 
relative subsidy in relation to gross income decreases in income in this example. Due 
to these factors, the selection issues can be assumed to be less significant in the Ger-
man SHI than in the U.S. However, they may still play a role. 
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Appendix C 
Table C 1: Sample Statistics - Overall Sample, 2001-2009 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variable 
   Premiums in Comprehensive  2,733 2,983.372 (971.759) 
Independent Variables 
   Percentage Medicaid 2,733 12.617 (3.535) 
Medicaid Costs  2,733 57.187 (15.951) 
 Medicaid Managed Care 2,733 71.409 (18.294) 
Percentage Uninsured 2,733 14.432 (4.706) 
Average Income 2,733 39.523 (5.333) 
Population over 65  2,733 12.786 (1.963) 
Hospitals  2,733 18.228 (9.765) 
Physician Salary 2,733 165.593 (21.487) 
HHI 2,733 2,526.177 (1,748.313) 
Number of Lines 2,733 2.911 (1.592) 
Number of States 2,733 1.659 (1.871) 
Market Share 2,733 9.674 (16.997) 
Capacity 2,733 8.176 (23.530) 
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Table C 2: Overview on State-run Medicaid States, 2001-2009 
State 
Premiums in 
Comprehensive  
HHI 
No. of 
Insurers 
Percentage 
Medicaid 
Medicaid 
Costs (in 
$100) 
Medicaid 
Managed 
Care 
Percentage 
Uninsured 
Popula-
tion 
over 65  
Average 
Income 
($1,000) 
Hospi-
tals  
Physi-
cian Sal-
ary 
($1,000) 
AK 3,961.46 9,714.66 2.18 13.35 82.30 0.00 17.83 6.77 41.51 30.12 144.64 
AL 3,132.40 8,228.68 4.39 13.97 47.88 75.03 13.43 13.28 32.38 23.64 142.54 
AR 2,839.68 4,514.39 5.92 15.70 38.00 59.69 17.32 13.92 31.09 25.06 198.61 
GA 2,823.33 2,447.96 12.96 12.23 37.41 69.07 17.40 9.71 35.05 16.54 186.04 
ID 2,882.62 5,545.07 6.86 11.68 54.54 82.18 15.21 11.70 32.59 26.85 174.02 
KY 3,178.71 3,600.90 8.17 14.57 50.41 89.70 14.01 12.63 31.50 25.03 162.09 
LA 3,096.05 3,241.28 8.73 14.94 42.01 60.52 18.36 11.82 33.92 29.39 180.33 
MD 2,999.97 1,597.48 14.62 8.44 70.16 84.53 13.06 11.53 46.46 8.54 155.35 
ME 4,037.10 5,087.97 5.44 18.72 63.51 61.54 9.87 14.59 35.49 28.50 141.22 
MS 2,901.10 8,946.04 2.79 21.07 43.09 15.09 17.24 12.30 29.22 32.73 164.62 
MT 2,758.09 6,938.98 4.04 11.86 58.84 65.63 16.12 13.86 33.46 52.11 135.87 
OK 2,758.69 3,064.26 7.86 13.42 42.45 90.82 17.65 13.24 34.48 32.04 163.62 
SD 3,016.62 4,067.77 5.14 10.81 50.25 93.44 11.47 14.25 36.62 66.23 173.47 
VT 3,654.44 3,745.72 3.52 18.96 53.97 75.57 10.17 13.29 37.60 22.74 131.03 
WY 3,092.58 5,922.49 3.41 10.33 64.02 0.00 14.74 11.99 43.81 47.18 176.37 
  
1
3
3
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Table C 3: Overview on Non-state-run Medicaid States, 2001-2009 
 
 
State 
Premiums 
in Compre-
hensive 
HHI 
No. of 
Insurers 
(Compre-
hensive) 
No. of 
Insurers 
(Medi-
caid) 
Percentage 
Medicaid 
Medicaid 
Costs        
(in $100) 
Medicaid 
Managed 
Care 
Percentage 
Uninsured 
Popu-
lation 
over 
65 
Average 
Income       
(in 
$1,000) 
Hospi-
tals 
Physician 
Salary       
(in 
$1,000) 
FL 2,970.97 1,569.83 22.76 10.83 10.92 45.07 67.23 19.54 16.96 38.60 11.42 138.14 
HI 2,221.43 5,630.87 4.60 2.16 11.71 44.82 82.42 8.58 13.88 39.61 19.26 152.31 
MA 3,654.44 2,646.99 14.77 2.26 15.18 74.46 74.82 7.95 13.32 49.01 12.33 184.97 
MN 2,831.49 3,027.31 8.62 2.10 10.77 82.10 73.99 8.34 12.16 41.94 25.98 173.25 
NJ 3,379.00 2,262.81 12.33 2.40 8.64 74.04 76.21 14.25 12.96 49.17 9.16 158.51 
NM 2,866.52 2,824.92 5.40 2.47 17.55 52.32 74.45 21.43 12.64 31.58 18.91 170.77 
NV 2,726.28 3,475.52 9.64 2.01 7.46 44.13 77.06 18.29 11.42 39.70 12.58 179.34 
NY 2,801.42 906.37 29.76 9.76 18.02 89.87 57.55 14.20 12.77 44.99 9.73 137.01 
PA 2,855.83 1,387.54 25.14 3.55 11.88 61.21 86.10 10.15 15.26 38.87 16.01 171.75 
RI 3,498.73 6,256.93 3.75 2.61 15.98 78.09 73.58 9.92 13.97 39.63 10.49 170.25 
TX 2,460.23 2,519.04 24.14 8.47 12.74 41.95 64.85 24.59 9.90 36.78 18.68 179.26 
VA 2,890.20 1,569.45 23.37 5.79 7.96 55.41 73.46 12.72 11.49 42.58 12.07 164.84 
WA 2,907.53 2,044.61 19.74 7.33 12.82 47.43 95.08 12.93 11.44 41.34 13.74 146.59 
WI 3,252.23 785.71 23.83 11.57 11.97 51.43 55.35 9.18 13.02 37.26 22.68 201.69 
WV 3,385.44 3,688.94 7.21 2.00 15.74 62.02 56.10 14.79 15.37 30.16 31.74 175.64 
1
3
4
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Table C 4: Comments on Dropping States from the Analysis 
 
STATE COMMENT 
AZ 6 percent of Medicaid enrollees are insured in a commercial MCO until 
2003. After 2004, no commercial insurer is active in Medicaid anymore. 
 
CA Most health insurers operating in California did not file with the NAIC. 
 
CO Mixed evidence. There are no commercial MCOs reported to CMS, but 
some insurers file positive Medicaid premiums in some years. 
 
CT Policy change in 2008. Before 2008, a great amount of Medicaid was in-
sured in commercial MCOs. In 2008 no commercial or Medicaid only 
MCOs existed. Since 2009 the greater share of Medicaid beneficiaries in 
insured in Medicaid only MCOs. 
 
DC  Dropped due to significant overlap with Virginia and Maryland. 
 
DE Policy change in 2004. Before 2004, a great amount of Medicaid was in 
commercial MCOs. Since 2004 no commercial or Medicaid only MCOs 
exists insuring the greater share of Medicaid beneficiaries in insured in 
Medicaid only MCOs. 
 
IA Policy change in 2005. Before 2005, around 15-20 percent of Medicaid 
beneficiaries were insured in commercial MCOs. After 2005 it is only 1 
percent and then 0 percent in 2009. 
 
IN Policy change in 2008. Before 2008, a great amount of Medicaid was in 
Medicaid only MCOs. In 2008, commercial MCOs started business. Since 
2009, the greater share of Medicaid beneficiaries in insured in commercial 
MCOs. 
 
KS No commercial MCOs are reported by CMS, however we find one insurer 
reporting Medicaid business.  
 
MI Policy change in 2008. Until 2007, around 10 percent of the Medicaid 
population was insured under commercial MCO. Since 2008, there are no 
commercial MCOs covering Medicaid beneficiaries. But in our insurer da-
ta, we still have 5 companies reporting positive Medicaid business.  
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STATE COMMENT 
MO Policy change in 2008. Until 2007, around 10 percent of the Medicaid 
population was insured under commercial MCO. Since 2008 there are no 
commercial MCOs covering Medicaid. In our insurer data no PHI is writing 
Medicaid business since 2006 beneficiaries. But in our insurer data, we 
still have 5 companies reporting positive Medicaid business.  
 
NC Until 2006 there was one commercial MCO covering 1 percent of the 
Medicaid population. Since 2007 Medicaid is completely state-run and 
non-commercial. 
 
ND Until 2005 one commercial MCO covered 1 percent of the state's Medi-
caid population. In 2006, this 1 percent was transferred to a Medicaid only 
MCO. Since 2007 Medicaid is completely state-run. 
 
NE Around 12-15 percent of the Medicaid population is insured by a com-
mercial MCO. However this only one Insurance company signing premi-
ums in Medicaid and this company fades in 2009. 
 
NH Had a change of regime in 2004. Since then there are no commercial 
MCOs in the market. 
 
OH Policy change. Until 2006, commercial MCOs were in the market only cov-
ering about 5 percent of the market. Since 2007, all Medicaid beneficiaries 
are insured under either a commercial or a Medicaid-only MCO, however 
our data doesn't show one single insurer writing Medicaid premiums after 
2007 and claims the state to be state-run. Since 2008 it is in fact state-run 
with no commercial MCOs reported to the CMS. 
 
OR 5 percent of Medicaid beneficiaries are insured in commercial MCOs over 
the whole observation period. There is only one single company reporting 
Medicaid business to NAIC and it faded in 2006. 
 
SC There are no commercial MCOs reported by CMS. In 2008 and 2009, three 
insurers reported positive premiums in Medicaid to NAIC. 
 
TN Policy change in 2009. Until 2008, almost 50 percent of Medicaid benefi-
ciaries were insured in commercial MCOs. Since 2009 there are no com-
mercial MCOs anymore. In our insurer data there is only one insurer re-
porting premiums in Medicaid, and in some years it fades. 
 
UT Policy change in 2003. After 2003 it is non-commercial. We still have one 
or two companies reporting small but positive premiums earned in Medi-
caid in 2004. 
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